Preliminary Consideration concerning the Nature of Theology and the Role of Theologians

Chapter 2 from Dissent In and For the Church

Theology is a scholarly discipline—in the strictest and contemporary sense of the term—whose complexities can be understood only in the light of its history and present methods. An understanding of theology’s truly scientific character is prerequisite to proper appreciation of its function in and for the Church. But although the function of the theology is clearly a scholarly one, it is not merely speculative endeavour. By the very nature of his discipline, the theologian must function in constant reference to the daily and actual living of the Christian life. In fact, all true theology is by its very nature pastoral; i.e., it has a direct relationship to the day- to-day life of the Church community.

Theology and the theologian are, by their very nature, directly relevant to countless persons not professionally engaged in the scholarly work itself. Theology is in constant dialogue with the living tradition of the Church. The theologian considers and evaluates the living experience of Christians today in the light of the total experience of the past and the previous theological reflections and formulations which expressed that experience. Furthermore, Vatican II emphasized the role of all the faithful in the Church and, at the same time, the co-responsibility of theologians in communicating to all Christians what they need to know in carrying out their particular responsibilities in and for the Church and the world. It would be a mistake to consider theology as anything other than a truly scientific, scholarly discipline; it would be equally wrong to consider it as purely “abstract” and without necessary relationship to the practice of the Christian life itself. Theology is at one and the same time speculative and practical, scientific and pastoral; the proper function of the theologian is measured by the very nature of his field.

Theology as a Science

Historical Development. Authoritative historians of theology show a development of theology as a science which has ebbed and flowed, not always advancing in a straight line. (2) It is generally held that theology became a science in the strict sense with the medieval rediscovery of the Aristotelian scientific ideal, certain knowledge of things through their causes. It then became possible to structure an ordered and systematic understanding of the Christian faith. The search for systematic, scientific understanding became the complex and enriching challenge of the medieval theologians.

After the medieval achievement, the science of theology in the Catholic tradition underwent a number of changes, some of which were detrimental to theology’s truly scientific character. Among the historical factors influencing the changed understanding of theology as a science were the late scholastic decline, Reformation— Counter-Reformation exigencies, seventeenth-century empirical scientific revolution, “enlightenment” attack upon tradition, rise of the subjectivist problem in post-Cartesian philosophy, development of the historico-critical method and the human sciences, and rise of the post-subjectivist problematic. (3)

The Council, however, reasserted the strictly scientific nature of the discipline called theology. “Nevertheless, if reason enlightened by faith studies the mysteries in a serious, dedicated, and humble way, it does achieve . . . some understanding of them and a most profitable one. (4 ) It is this understanding that theology strives to attain—a knowledge that is not faith but an understanding of faith, a knowledge that is not infused but acquired with human effort, a knowledge that differs radically from philosophical knowledge about God because its object is revealed mystery and because it engages not reason alone but reason enlightened by faith. It is an understanding that although imperfect will continue to grow until faith is dissolved in the vision of God Himself. “Let there be growth . . . and all possible progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom whether in single individuals or in the whole body, in each man as well as in the entire Church, according to the stage of their development. (5)

The Council decree further suggested the scientific framework for a systematic theology as the systematic understanding of God and human existence built upon three main methodological factors: analogies from nature, the interconnection of the mysteries (analogy of faith) and the relationship of the mysteries to the final end of man. Further developed, these same factors remain the foundation of the science of theology today. The “analogies from nature” may be drawn from various human sciences and from a pluralism of philosophical positions, and the “analogy of faith” has become far more complex as the return to Christian sources via the historico-critical method has enriched the entire enterprise.

Complexities of Contemporary Scientific Theology. A science develops only after there has been opportunity for reflection and systematization. Since the very nature of “scientific” work has changed and continues to change, theology has also experienced continuing development and growth. Its task, therefore, must be considered in light of the complexities of its developing insights.

Theologians know that man has become more conscious of the historical and cultural limitations which affect all human knowledge and science as well as theology. Historical growth and development have alerted modern theologians to the development of doctrine and the consequent need to study it in the light of its historical unfolding. They recognize the need to study the sources of theology by use of historico-critical methodology. This approach which was also influenced by the advances of the empirical scientific method, has fostered development of a variety of disciplines embraced in the concept of “positive theology”: for example, biblical theology, patristic theology, liturgical theology.

The developing meaning and understanding of science itself has profoundly affected contemporary theology. The object of science has changed from the Aristotelian-Scholastic ideal (“certain knowledge of things through their causes”)—and the resultant concern for universality, necessity and certainty—to the contemporary scientific ideal (complete explanation of all data in terms of their intelligible relationships)—and the resultant concern for development, probability and matter-of-factness. This shift has resulted in a different attitude toward certitude and method in science, which, in turn, has brought about a restructuring in all contemporary, systematic sciences, including theology.

The recognition of the historical and cultural limitations of all human knowing and the changed understanding of the notion of science create basic problems for theology. As a result many contemporary theologians see a need to re-evaluate the method employed by the science of theology. In the more contemporary notion of science, greater stress is placed upon a more inductive approach; the contemporary theologian is also faced with a “knowledge explosion.” The theologian must be familiar with many diverse specializations: biblical theology, sociology, patristic theology and psychology. More importantly, the theologian must develop a method for evaluating, coordinating and synthesizing all the relevant data. In the light of an appreciation of historical growth and development, the theologian realizes he will never attain the older ideal of absolute certitude. Clear, simple and absolutely complete answers are not considered achievable in contemporary theological investigation. These characteristics of all science today, moreover, are felt even more acutely by the theologian, because theology ultimately deals with the mystery of God. Theology takes its beginning from the faith-commitment of the believer; theological meaning thus can never be fully understandable to any human interpreter.

Although the recognition of complexity and inherent limitations in theology is fairly common among theologians today, it is not peculiar to contemporary theology. Scholasticism at its best (e.g., in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas) always recognized the originating and determining mystery of the faith-data it attempted to understand systematically, and spoke of the role of theology as relating systematically (via the scholastic technique of “negative coherence”; i.e., no demonstrable intrinsic contradiction, but no positive demonstration) to a deeper recognition of the mystery of God’s revelation to man in Christ Jesus and in his Church. The doctrinal statement of the First Vatican Council leads to the same recognition of the real but partial and analogous understanding proper to the theologian’s task. The object of interpretive scientific theology is not only the manifestation of that faith-commitment in the Christian tradition, but also the complex development of that faith-commitment in history and in mystery.

The Problem of Interpretation: Theology and Tradition

The theologian as a scientist is primarily involved in the work of systematic reflection and interpretation. He operates within the context of the Christian theological tradition which must be constantly reinterpreted in the light of the thought patterns and expressions of the present time.

Two Opposite Dangers. Throughout the history of theological interpretation in the Church, there have been two persistent temptations:
a) either simply to accept an unappropriated tradition by a word-for-word repetition of previous formulae without any realization of the historical and cultural limitations inherent in any such human thought and speech. One example is the problem of extrinsicism, or what has come to be called “Denzinger theology,” the mere verbal repetition of previously defined or taught formulae found in Henry Denzinger’s standard anthology of conciliar, papal and episcopal utterances;

b) or to ignore the tradition and deny it any value, so that theology is reconstructed solely in the light of present experience (e.g., the extremes of the so-called “Modernist” movement at the beginning of this century).

Nevertheless, all the major figures of the Catholic theological tradition (Origen, Augustine, Aquinas and Newman; and, among contemporaries, Congar, Rahner, Lonergan and Schillebeeckx) effectively avoid both false polarities because they have realized the interpretive (hermeneutic) difficulties involved in genuine theological work. These theologians realize the inadequacy of extrinsicist notions of authority and tradition in relation to the theologian’s interpretive task—whether such extrinsicism be understood as a simple, uninterpreted and non-contextualized imposition from without (the alternative of the “right”) or as a simple, uninterpreted and non-contextualized rejection of tradition (the alternative of the “Enlightenment” and the “Modernist left”).

Unfortunately, some contemporary commentators have been unable to properly interpret the theological position of the major figures in the history of theology. Aquinas, for example, is often interpreted either as a “rationalist” or a “fideist,” with no recognition of how he transcends either category. Newman has been quoted for “authority” alone in one series of proof-texts or for “conscience” alone in another,(6) with little or no recognition that his or any authentic theologian’s thought involves the constant dialectic between faith and reason, authority and conscience, and tradition and scientific theology.

The contemporary insights with respect to the related matters of hermeneutics, of theological method and especially of the development of doctrine have freed the theologian to recognize the dual exigencies inherent in accepting as his data the true meaning of the tradition: the need to recognize the validity of the tradition and, at the same time, the need to recognize its inherent cultural and historical limitations.

Greater Complexities Today of Doctrinal Development. The matter of doctrinal development has become the central question for many Catholic thinkers, particularly during the present century. The contemporary theologian would be aware of the positive advances in understanding this development achieved by the use of the historico-critical method and by the proposed explanations of such figures as Newman, Blondel or Moehler in an earlier generation or Rahner, Congar, Murray or Lonergan in the present generation. Vatican II, with its declarations on collegiality and religious liberty, has made every contemporary theologian particularly familiar with doctrinal development and with the implications of that process for his interpretive endeavours. Moreover, every theologian would further recall that the alternatives of “Modernism” (which attempted to eliminate the reality of the doctrinal principle or tradition by negating its truth-value) or of “manualism” (whose proof-text method denigrated the reality of development) are both inadequate to handle the dual reality of doctrines as truly expressing the faith yet remaining ever open to further refinement and development. Indeed, as the problems associated with eucharistic theology or Christology in recent years make clear, the contemporary theological enterprise has been engaged in a multidimensional and multileveled attempt to understand and to find the categories adequate for expressing the reality of doctrinal development.

In this context the interpretive difficulties of the theologian are manifold. He must consider every theological reality in the light of the best scientific methods developed in the various theological specializations. In doctrinal theology, for example, the theologian must be fully familiar with the doctrinal weight accorded each doctrinal definition, e.g., the actual truth defined in the conciliar decrees on the reality of purgatory and hell (which may be considerably less than or different from what is assumed by the popular Catholic mind). He must be prepared to understand the definition within its historical context, while neither ignoring the truth-value of the definition (the temptation of pure relativism) nor simply repeating extraneous formulations in a later and differently developed context. He must find categories to “bring that reality to speech anew,” to develop it, to re- express it and to re-thematize it. The theologian realizes that not every expression will be adequate; hence, he presents his expression to and within the Church community for its theological and sometimes doctrinal critique.

Need to Communicate Interpretations. The contemporary theologian is likewise aware that part of the data of theology is the living experience of man. The Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Liberty recognizes that the need for religious liberty was appreciated by many men of goodwill through their human experience before it was formulated and expressed by the Council. Likewise, the call for dialogue with all men of goodwill issued by Popes John XXIII and Paul VI and by the Second Vatican Council confirms that the theologian can learn from the contemporary experience not only of Christians but of all men. Thus the theologian must always be in dialogue with contemporary Christian and human experience.

In the renewal of theology and in the contemporary perspective of Vatican II there has been a demand that theology be more explicitly relevant. The contemporary theologian must be in dialogue with modern science as a key factor in contemporary human experience. He must interpret the tradition for contemporary man and express this interpretation in an idiom which people living today can understand and accept. In approaching his task, the contemporary theologian is sustained by the model of St. Thomas Aquinas, who did not merely repeat the past Christian tradition but, rather, reinterpreted it in the light of the Greek philosophy then current in European universities. The theologian has the responsibility and obligation to make his theological interpretation available to all; he understands that all men are called to hear the good news of Christianity and to have some reflective and systematic understanding of Christian truth to the extent that they are in need of such understanding and capable of assimilating it.

The contemporary scene is marked by a growing popular interest in theological and philosophical questions, due in part to the educational attainments of so many people today. The “popularity” of theology today is evidenced by the number of books published every year on theological topics, some of which have even made “best-seller” lists. The contemporary theologian is continually asked to lecture to widely diverse audiences. The daily press gives extensive coverage not only to religious events but to theology itself. All these factors indicate that many people are looking for the interpretations which the professional theologian can give. But this does not mean that the professional theologian is merely to be a popularizer in the pejorative sense of that term.

The Manualist Tradition and Communication. The same need to communicate theological interpretations in terms of practical evaluation of concrete life situations is clearly evidenced in the hand-books of moral theology which have existed in various forms for many centuries. This genre of theological writing continues to provide practical moral guidance in our time and exemplifies the peculiarly pastoral function of theology. The manuals were and occasionally are still used in the education of Catholic seminarians and priests. Until very recently, most catechetic materials for all levels of instructions were nothing more than popularized and vernacularized versions of the standard manuals of moral theology. Even a cursory glance at the manuals reveals page after page of the most minute directions for the practical living of the Christian life by clergy and faithful. Hardly any possible situation is omitted from consideration by the manualists, and precise, concrete “do’s” and “don’ts” are prescribed without equivocation.

Professional theologians have long been called upon to use other types of popular theological literature to communicate their interpretations and give concrete guidance in the living of the Christian life. In contemporary times, for example, most American Catholics are familiar with the “Question Box” format of theological literature employed in Catholic newspapers and periodicals, and with the practice of many parishes to provide regularly sponsored lectures by professional theologians on issues of concrete Christian living. The identifiable pastoral role exercised by professional Catholic theologians during the past four centuries is a fact of Church life.

The Theologian in the Contemporary Ecclesiological Context. Since the theologian functions in and for the Church, the contemporary ecclesiological context is an intrinsic modifying factor of the exercise of his function. The ecclesiological context of the manualist era has been notably modified in recent decades. The pertinent elements of the post-Vatican II ecclesial self-awareness will be detailed in chapter four, but it is well to note here that the Council articulated certain fresh ecclesiological self-conceptions already apparent in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. Since the Council, Roman Catholic teaching and preaching have stressed that all men are called to perfection and that all Christians are expected to live a full participation in the life of the Church, each according to his proper office or role. The Council and post-conciliar theology emphasize the specifically Christian task of building a better human society and the correlative right to the necessary knowledge and guidance for accomplishing this task.

The professional theological community is intensely aware of the co-responsibility among its members and of their collective responsibility with persons holding different offices or exercising different functions in the Church. The theologian recognizes the duty to make his specific contribution, a duty deeply rooted in doctrinal and ecclesiological convictions. To be sure, he is also “conscious of his duties and limitations.” He thus acknowledges a distinct hierarchical function and mission in the Church, as well as other functions, ministries and gifts in the Church.

Quantity and Quality of Theological Interpretation. Human prudence attaches weight to the quantity and quality of persons holding a particular conviction. This never constitutes an absolute norm but only a prudential presupposition to be taken into consideration by one about to act. There is also an important principle in theology somewhat related to this aspect of human prudence. Long before the contemporary ecclesiological context the theologian was aware that he does not function in isolation from and independent of other theologians in the Church. The number and stature of theologians holding a particular position has great theological and pastoral significance in Roman Catholicism. Catholic theology has traditionally given interpretive weight to the extent, both quantitative and qualitative, to which a particular teaching is held by theologians. This factor is clearly pertinent to the history of systematic theology.

In the history of systematic moral theology, the problem of acting when one does not have certitude is functionally solved by a principle or system known as “probabilism.” Probabilism, first proposed by Bartholomew Medina, O.P., in the sixteenth century, maintains that a person is not obliged to follow a more strict position (even if it is more probable) if there exists a more lenient opinion which is itself truly probable. “Probable opinion” is a word of art meaning a responsible theological view which is or can be supported by truly weighty considerations and arguments, but does not deny that other, even contrary, views may be equally or more supportable. (“Probable” here is to be understood in the Latin sense of “prove-able” or “support-able.”)

Generally, the hierarchical magisterium and theologians have agreed that a probable opinion furnishes any individual in the Church a safe and secure norm to follow. The important questions are who determines and what constitutes a probable opinion. In this regard theologians speak of intrinsic and extrinsic probabilism. Intrinsic probabilism is established by the merits of the reasons supporting the opinion, which need not rise to the level of moral certitude. Extrinsic probabilism, by contrast, rests on reason and on the number and quality of theologians who hold the particular view. Standard textbooks of moral theology generally agree that both the theological competency of the individual involved and the number of theologians holding an opinion enter into the determination of extrinsic probability. For example, the theology manuals speak of five or six authors of great repute as constituting a probable opinion; on particular issues, views of one outstanding theologian, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, could constitute a truly probable opinion. The methodology often employed in moral theology textbooks is merely to list the number of theologians maintaining a particular opinion in order to prove its probability. (7)

Theologians, therefore, are frequently asked whether or not a particular opinion is probable. Contemporary theologians must, of course, be engaged in ongoing reinterpretation of past articulations of the principle of probabilism itself. Some theologians today would rightly condemn the excesses that were sometimes associated with extrinsic probabilism. But all contemporary theologians would admit that there is theological and pastoral importance in the number and quality of theologians who maintain a particular position.

The Interpretive Possibility of Dissent

Particular interpretations of theologians may, of course, be truly probable but still run counter to the established opinion or to the teaching proposed by the papal and hierarchical teaching offices. The task of reinterpretation of the total theological tradition in the light of the present self-awareness of the Church may at times involve theologians in the type of particular interpretation which the older manuals labelled a “dissent.” That “dissent” is an interpretive or re-interpretive possibility has been clearly acknowledged and taught in the “manualistic” tradition of theology even since the sixteenth century. Even leaving aside the contemporary ecclesiological context, practicing theologians could spontaneously recite a list of subjects in which the possibility of “dissent” was brought to actuality in their own or their colleagues’ published works and classroom lectures. This is common knowledge in such areas as theological anthropology (e.g., the doctrine of original sin, monogenistic origin of the human race), sacramentology (e.g., validity of Anglican Orders, specific confessional enumeration of sins, nature of eucharistic presence), ecclesiology (e.g., genuine ecclesiality of separated Christian communities, diverse function of some ecclesial structures), ecclesiastical discipline arising from a doctrinal basis (e.g., obligatory clerical celibacy, many practical liturgical stipulations) and biblical exegesis and theology (e.g., decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission). “Dissenting” interpretations and reinterpretations of fallibly-taught doctrines are part and parcel of active theological life. This “right to dissent” from authoritative, fallible teachings of the magisterium must, however, be thoroughly examined and then reinterpreted in the light of contemporary theological advances and the present ecclesiological context.

Dissent as Interpretation in the Earlier Vocabulary of the “Manual” Tradition

The standard, classically recognized “right to dissent” described by the theological authors in the “manual” tradition is to some degree pertinent testimony that a theologian’s function of interpretation may, at times, take the form of dissent. “Manual” denotes certain textbook presentations of theology, usually intended for use in seminary theology courses. Such works are a distinct literary genre, whose limitations are well known.8 The following manuals, to be cited herein, date from 1891 to 1963, and are representative of the textbooks used in seminaries and schools of theology throughout the Catholic world:

D. Palmieri, De Romano Pontifice cum prolegomeno De Ecclesia (2nd edition, Prato: Giacchetti, 1891) (hereinafter called Palmieri);
C. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, t. I: Institutiones Propaedeuticae ad Sacram Theologiam (Freiburg: Herder, 1915) (hereinafter called Pesch);
H. Dieckmann, De Ecclesia, t. II (Freiburg: Herder, 1925) (hereinafter called Dieckmann);
J. M. Herve, Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae, t. I (Paris: Berche & Pagis, 1934) (hereinafter called Herve);
L. Lercher, Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae (5th edition by F. Schlagenhaufen), t. I (Barcelona: Herder, 1951) (hereinafter called Lercher);
J. Salaverri, De Ecclesia Christi in Sacrae Theologiae Summa, t. I (Madrid: B.A.C., 1955) (hereinafter called Salaverri);
F. A. Sullivan, De Ecclesia, I: Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1963) (hereinafter called Sullivan).

Ordinary Papal Teaching: Authoritative but Noninfallible.(9) The manuals describe the “ordinary papal magisterium,” or teaching office of the pope, as the day-to-day proposal of Catholic teaching that the pope articulates in his sermons, addresses and encyclicals: “that exercise of his teaching office by which the pope intends to teach, but does not make clear his intention of imposing his judgment as absolutely definitive and irreformable.” (10)

The ordinary teaching office of the pope is commonly regarded by theologians as fallible.(11) But the manualists say that the pope’s ordinary teaching office is “authoritative” even when fallible. The manuals distinguish between a magisterium mere docens seu scientificum (merely teaching or scientific), to which assent is given because of the reasons the teacher offers, and a magisterium auctoritativum (authoritative), to which assent is given because of the authority of the teacher. (12) The pope, unlike the teacher whose teaching stands or falls by the merit and strength of the arguments he presents, has been given an authority to teach which can require assent even when his reasons are not in themselves convincing.(13) His is a magisterium authenticum, where authenticum mean not “authentic,” but “authoritative” or “official.”

Corresponding Obligation of Assent. In the case of such ordinary magisterium, the manuals hold that one is obliged to give “internal, religious assent.” Assent is an act “by which what is contained in the decree is affirmed to be true.” (14) The assent must be internal and sincere; external conformity or respectful silence is not sufficient.(15) The requisite assent is termed “religious” because its motive is that the pope has been given authority to teach by Christ. (16)

Such “internal, religious assent,” however, is to be distinguished from the assent of “divine faith.” (There has long been a dispute concerning the existence of a third category of assent called “ecclesiastical faith,” which would apply to those infallible statements of the Church that do not concern matters formally revealed.(17) The motive for an act of divine faith is the unfailing authority of God; the motive for “internal religious assent” is the authority of the teaching office in question.(18) Divine faith is absolutely certain and super omnia firma, supremely firm; internal religious assent is not absolutely certain and not supremely firm; internal religious assent is not absolutely or metaphysically certain(19)—most of the authors speak of religious assent as “morally certain.” (20)

Divine faith is to be given without qualification or condition; this is not true of internal religious assent. Lercher speaks of religious assent as not objectively certain because it rests upon a motive that does not exclude the possibility of error and is known to be such. It is presumed, however, that in any concrete case the magisterium is not in error. Such presumption does not exclude the possibility of error but only its present likelihood. Most of the manualist authors assert explicitly that religious assent is conditional.(21) Palmieri and Pesch do not use that term respecting religious assent, but they imply that such assent is conditional because they acknowledge the possibility of dissent (22)

The Possibility of Dissent. Although these manualists agree that internal religious assent is subject to conditions, they are rather general in describing those conditions. Salaverri expresses the permissible qualification of assent in the following manner: “unless by an equal or superior authority the Church should decree otherwise.”(23) For Sullivan, the condition is “unless the Church should at some time decide otherwise or unless the contrary should become evident.” (24) For Lercher, dissent is not permissible “unless a grave suspicion should arise that the presumption is not verified.” (25) Pesch speaks of the binding force of pronouncements “so long as it does not become positively clear that they are wrong,” and adds that “assent is prudently suspended when there first appear sufficient motives for doubting.” (26) Straub is quoted by Salaverri as holding that it is licit to dissent, to doubt or to continue to regard the opposite opinion as probable “if the decree should appear to someone to be certainly false or to be opposed to so solid a reason that the force of this reason cannot be shattered even by the weight of the sacred authority.” (27) Palmieri holds that “religious assent is owed when there is nothing which could prudently persuade one to suspend his assent. The assent is morally certain; therefore, should motives appear, whether they be true or false (but from inculpable error), which persuade one to a different view, then in those circumstances the will would not act imprudently in suspending assent.” (28)

With the possible exception of Salaverri, then, these manualists admit that a Catholic could have sufficient reason to justify withholding assent to a teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the pope. (Dieckmann and Salaverri alone suggest that only a theologian could find himself in such a position;(29) the others apply the qualification quite generally.) Nor do these authors suggest that the reasons for dissent must be new ones, not previously considered by the magisterium.

On the other hand, the manualists insist that the presumption initially favours the teaching of the ordinary magisterium, and that assent may not be suspended rashly or casually from a motive of pride, “excessive love of one’s own opinions” or “over-confidence in one’s own genius.” (30) Palmieri, however, at least suggests that certain cases, such as Celestine Ill’s permission of divorce and remarriage in the case of the heresy of a spouse, or the Galileo matter, may prove “both the exception that we have allowed for and that metaphysically certain assent is not required.” (31) Similarly. Sullivan implies error in the ordinary magisterium on the part of Popes Liberius, Vigilius and Honorius. (32)

Error: Detection and Correction. Three of the manualists explore more fully the possibility of error and of its correction, although their consideration of the possibility represents only initial analysis.

Sullivan admits that a pope could make a mistake, but he insists that it would never become the “constant and traditional teaching of the Holy See.”(33) In rejecting the claim that the ordinary magisterium of the pope is infallible, Sullivan takes the following position:

It seems to be possible that a pope, teaching modo ordinario, might propose a judgment that would have to be corrected afterward, without the whole Church being drawn into error thereby. In such a case, the divine assistance would be enough to assure that the error would be corrected before it was generally accepted by the Church and to prevent the erroneous teaching from becoming the traditional teaching of the Holy See.(34)

He asserts that “an error in the ordinary magisterium could be corrected before the whole Church were led into error.”(35) But at no point does he indicate how that end might be accomplished in fact.

Dieckmann makes the following statement in a discussion of the assistance of the Holy Spirit that accompanies the daily exercise of the ordinary magisterium:

It must be conceded that the influence of this assistance cannot be determined accurately, so that each doctrinal act could be said to have been made under this special assistance which preserves one from error. If that were true, all the acts would be infallible. The assertion is rather a universal one: generally the Holy Spirit will preserve the organs of the authoritative magisterium from error especially in those decisions which are prepared and issued with the necessary diligence, caution and scholarship. (36)

This concession by a leading manualist contrasts with the fear sometimes voiced that to acknowledge the possibility or fact of error is to deny the assistance of the Holy Spirit.

Pesch approaches the problem obliquely, in a discussion of the process of determining the reasons for a pronouncement:

Since the pope’s congregations do not per se supply an absolutely certain argument for their teaching, one can and, it may be, one must inquire into the reasons for the teaching. In this way it may come about either that the teaching in question will slowly be received by the whole Church and thus be raised to the level of infallibility, or that the error will be detected.(37)

Lercher approaches the question of dissent more directly than the foregoing three authors:

If the supreme pontiff, exercising his authority, but not at its highest level, obliges all to assent to a thing as true (because revealed or coherent with revelation), he does not seem to be infallible de jure nor is it necessary to say that the Holy Spirit would never permit such a decree to be issued, if it should be erroneous.

It is true that the Holy Spirit will never allow the Church to be led into error by such a decree. The way in which error would be excluded would more probably consist in the assistance of the Holy Spirit given to the head of the Church, by which such an erroneous decree would be prevented. But it is not entirely out of the question that the error might be excluded by the Holy Spirit in his way, namely, by the subjects of the decree detecting its error and ceasing to give it their internal assent. (38)

Lercher also makes a similar comment about the decrees of the papal congregations: “If by such a decree the affirmation of the truth of some matter should be objectively false, the Holy Spirit would not permit error: probably by his assistance he would not move the bishops and faithful to give a firm internal assent.39 It is not out of the question that the Holy Spirit might assist individual bishops or even individual members of the faithful, so that they would not err, when the magisterium teaches authoritatively but not infallibly.” (40) The cogency of these statements is not affected by the fact that Lercher is extremely skeptical about whether such a situation justifying dissent will ever arise. Lercher is the only manualist who suggests how the Church could correct an error taught by the ordinary magisterium. Lercher views such correction as the work of the Holy Spirit, but he does not exclude the faithful from participation in this corrective work, that is, from participation in such dissent.

Lercher’s position parallels such views as Newman’s “on consulting the faithful in matters of doctrine” and Bishop Gasser’s (the official relator at the First Vatican Council) insistence that the pope has a moral obligation to consult the Church before approaching an infallible declaration. (41) Lercher’s position, moreover, calls to mind a set of traditional discussions from the eleventh century, recently rediscovered by modern scholarship, concerning the possibility of a pope becoming a heretic or a schismatic. (42) Popes, canonists and theologians have acknowledged the possibility of papal heresy or schism, and some nine centuries of theological and canonical discussion have included consideration of what the Church at large could do in such a case. (43)

At least this much is clear: there remain within the Church-at- large norms of doctrine and practice which are not dependent on the pope; that there are circumstances, however unlikely one may judge them to be, in which it could be necessary for the Church to judge and correct the pope; and that the destiny of the Church is not totally committed into the hands of the pope alone.

Dissent as a Legitimate Interpretive Option. The tradition reflected by the manuals, therefore, teaches both the duty of internal religious assent to ordinary papal teaching and the possible legitimacy of dissent. In the earlier “manual” vocabulary, dissent clearly is a legitimate interpretive possibility for the competent Roman Catholic, for sufficient reasons, in response to an authoritative, non-infallible teaching of the hierarchical/papal magisterium.

American Bishops on Assent and Dissent. The “right to dissent” articulated in the manuals is acknowledged in many recent pastoral statements of national hierarchies.(44) The American Bishops’ Pastoral Letter of 1967, The Church in Our Day, sharply departed from the usual theological vocabulary with respect to the forms of assent and failed to indicate even the possibility of dissent. As a result, it not only did not deal with norms for dissent from ordinary magisterial teaching45 but left the faithful unprepared for the problems generated by the publication of Humanae Vitae. Following the theologians’ dissent from the Encyclical, this inadequacy in the 1967 Pastoral was only partially corrected in the American Bishops’ 1968 Pastoral, Human Life in Our Day. (46)

Preliminary Reflections on the Traditional Right of Dissent: Need for Reinterpretation

The perspective of the manuals concerning assent and dissent suffers from serious philosophical and theological limitations. The manuals’ analyses of the nature of assent is inadequate, and quite oblivious to the crucial questions raised by Newman in his Grammar of Assent. How would the manualists have reacted to Newman’s view that assent is by nature unconditional? “No one can hold conditionally what by the same act he holds to be true.”(47) The discussion of what Newman terms “opinion” is also of interest to the discussion of a type of “assent” that is merely a “presumption” of truth. (48)

The manuals also tend to pass over rather quickly the problem created by using such words as “authority” and “obedience” when speaking of “teaching.” The association of the words “teaching” and “authority” is not without ambiguity. Surely the use of the word “authority” with respect to teaching is at best only analogous to its use with respect to law. Does “authority” to teach derive from a source other than the possession of truth? The manualists seem to think so; Palmieri (49) and Pesch(50) add to the obligation of assent to a word from God that derives from natural law (not to mention common sense) another obligation of assent that derives from the “authority” of the Church.

The manuals do not adequately consider the relationship of the roles of the mind and of the will with respect to assent, with the result that the movement from “assent” to “obedience,” and vice-versa, seems too facile. Perhaps these difficulties derive from too close association (not to say identification) of the magisterial and juridical functions of authority.(51) Such associations would cause misgivings even if the notion of law involved were properly intellectualist; when it is voluntaristic, the danger of accepting a notion of truth as whatever authority happens to teach is greatly increased.

The shift in theological ideal from the medieval quest for understanding to the post-Tridentine passion for certainty is also not without its importance for the development of the kind of perspective present in the manuals. The foregoing deficiences are suggested merely to indicate the necessity of reinterpreting the manualist tradition in the light of the contemporary theological and ecclesiological context. Such re-interpretation will merely begin with the affirmation of the manualists that the possibility of dissent from authoritative teaching is an integral part of the ac-cepted dynamics of theology.

Another aspect of the need for reinterpreting the manualists’ presentation of the right to dissent was suggested by Professor John “Noonan, of the School of Law, University of California (Berkeley), in the expert testimony he delivered before the Inquiry Panel at Catholic University. Professor Noonan pointed out the importance of taking careful account of the special problems faced by the Roman Catholic Church arising from the nineteenth century political and religious milieu within which many of the manuals were first published. He testified that to restrict the right to dissent to private or semiprivate presentations addressed directly to the Holy See (the curious distinction between “internal” and “external” dissent) could have resulted from the defensive attitude of the church at that time with respect to the non-Catholic religious community in Europe and all the other complex forces, intellectual and political, which seemed to threaten the Church’s survival. The fear that dissenting voices within the Church would be unfairly used against the Church, especially by the Protestant community, may very well have influenced the severe restrictions of the manualists on external or public dissent even from clearly acknowledged fallible teachings of the papal magisterium.

Furthermore, an understanding of the nature and function of the magisterium, or teaching office in the Church, is a prerequisite to any attempt to reinterpret the right to dissent in its present practical context. The manualist articulation of the possibility of dissent evidences a static conception of the relationship between the bishops’ teaching office, the theologians’ scientific role and the living witness of faithful Christians. Indeed, characterizing a particular theological response to a hierarchical pronouncement as “dissent” from “the magisterium” or from “the teaching of the Church” ignores the history of doctrinal development. A more dynamic view of the workings of the Spirit in the Church would see room and reason for dialogue in the quest for truth, dialogue which would be frustrated in a structure in which the teaching function was firmly and exclusively fixed at one level of communication within the Church. Thus the process of arriving at the teaching of the Church must be re-examined within the framework of co-responsibility in the Church to determine the proper relationship between the theologians’ teaching office and the hierarchical magisterium and the relationship of both to the whole Church as “magistral.”

This preliminary consideration of the nature of theology and the role of theologians has recalled several points which are essential both to the question of reinterpretation in general and the problem of responsible dissent from the Encyclical Humanae Vitae in particular. To summarize, theology is a science in the strict sense, and as a science is limited only by truth and the implications of its data. It would cease to be a science if it were not free to arrive at conclusions which are suggested by its research and supported by its data. A theologian operates in the context of particular traditions and is to be presumed loyal to those traditions. A Roman Catholic theologian theologizes within the context of a Roman Catholic faith-commitment. This theological enterprise is delicate and complex.

As theology sharpens its interpretive skills, it becomes increasingly aware of its multiple possibilities and the inevitability and normalcy of theological pluralism. Catholic theologians welcome the contributions of the hierarchical magisterium, while recognizing (with the traditional manuals) the possibility of “licit dissent.” Because of the frequent obscurity of the matters that it treats, theology can never be an individualistic pursuit. It is always a communal endeavour. Theologians must check the thinking of others in their field in order to test their own positions.

Communication among theologians alone would not satisfy the “need to know” of the whole Church, which has always sought the practical guidance of the theological community. Thus, theology is not merely a matter of intellectual exercise but has a distinct pastoral dimension. The theologian has an obligation to bear witness to the achievements of his science by means that are suited to the current state of culture and communications. The specification of that obligation with respect to interpretive possibilities that in the vocabulary of the manualists were labelled “dissents” is itself an object of theological endeavour, particularly through a reinterpretation of the relationship of theologians with the hierarchical magisterium in the context of the ecclesiological theme of co-responsibility.

Notes

The self-understanding of the Roman Catholic theologian expressed in this chapter is not unique to the Catholic University Theologians. It is shared by such noted contemporary theologians as M. Chenu, Y. Congar, H. Kiing, B. Lonergan, K. Rahner and E. Schillebeeckx. See H. Kiing, “The Freedom of Theology,” in Freedom Today (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1966), pp. 66-108; B. Lonergan, “Theology in Its New Context,” in L. K. Shook, ed., Theology of Renewal, vol. I (New York: Herder, 1968), pp. 34-46; Y. Congar, “Theology’s Tasks After Vatican II,” in Shook, op. cit., pp. 47-65; K. Rahner, “Theology and the Magisterium After the Council,” Theology Digest (Special Sesquicentennial Issue, 1968), pp. 4-16; E. Schillebeeckx, “Toward a Catholic Use of Hermeneutic,” in God the Future of Man (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1968), pp. 1-49.
Y. Congar, A History of Theology (New York: Doubleday, 1968).
This period in Catholic theology is well summarized in Congar, op. cit., pp. 187-89.
Denzinger-Schoenmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 32d edition (Barcelona: Herder, 1963), n. 3016 (hereinafter cited merely as Denz.).
Denz., 3020.
See the American Bishops’ Pastoral Statement, Human Life in Our Day (November, 1968), Washington: United States Catholic Conference (U.S.C.C.), passim, and the comments of I. Haughey, “The Bishops and Cardinal Newman,” America 119 (Nov. 30, 1968), PP- 554-55-
All standard authors of moral theology manuals treat the moral system of “probabilism” at some length: cf. e.g., the works of Noldin- Schmitt, Regatillo-Zalba, Iorio, Vermeersch, Pruemmer.
Y. Congar, op. cit., pp. 177-95.
The editors acknowledge their debt of gratitude to Professor Joseph A. Komonchak of St. Josheph’s Seminary (Dunwoodies), Yonkers, N.Y., and Professor Harry McSorley of St. Paul’s College, Wash¬ington, D.C., for the valuable contribution their research on the problem of dissent in the manualists has made to this section of our presentation. Cf. J. A. Komonchak, “Ordinary Papal Magisterium and Religious Assent,” in C. E. Curran, ed., Contraception: Authority and Dissent (New York: Herder, 1969), pp. 101-26. In August, 1968 Professor Komonchak prepared, on behalf of the Catholic University theologians, a brief analysis of the manualists’ teaching on dissent for use in the Statler-Hilton meeting. He subsequently expanded his work to include the background and correct understanding of paragraph 25 of Lumen Gentium and offered it to the subject professors for use in their presentation to the Inquiry Board. It is essentially this study which was incorporated into the work herein cited. Professor McSorley also made his study available to the professors.
F. A. Sullivan, De Ecclesia, I: Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamentalis (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1963), p. 349. See also L. Lercher, Institutiones Theologiae Dogmaticae (5th edition by F. Schlagenhaufen), t. I (Barcelona: Herder, 1951), p. 296, and H. Dieckmann, De Ecclesia, t. II (Freiburg: Herder, 1925), p. 91.
Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 348-52; J. Salaverri, De Ecclesia Christi in Sacrae Theologiae Summa, t. I (Madrid: B.A.C., 1955), pp. 709-10.
Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 258-59; Salaverri, op. cit., pp. 662-63; Lercher, op. cit., pp. 158, 257; D. Palmieri, De Romano Pontifice cum pro-legomeno De Ecclesia, 2nd edition (Prato: Giacchetti, 1891), p. 167.
Palmieri, op. cit., 719; C. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, t. I: Institutiones Propaedeuticae ad Sacram Theologiam (Freiburg: Herder: I9!5)> P- 370; Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116; Lercher, op. cit., pp. 297-98; Salaverri, op. cit., pp. 716-18; Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 345-48.
Lercher, op. cit., p. 297; Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116; Salaverri, op. cit.,p. 716; Sullivan, op. cit., p. 347.
Palmieri, op. cit., p. 719; Pesch, op. cit., p. 370; Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116; Lercher, op. cit., p. 297; Salaverri, op. cit., p. 716; Sullivan, op. cit., p. 347.
Pesch, op. cit., p. 370; Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116; Lercher, op. cit., p. 297; Salaverri, op. cit., p. 716; Sullivan, op. cit., p. 347.
Y. Congar, “Foi dogmatique et ‘foi ecclesiastique,'” in Catholicisme,t. IV, col. 1059-67, reprinted in Sainte Eglise (Paris: du Cerf, 1963). PP- 357-73-
Palmieri, op. cit., p. 719; Pesch, op. cit., p. 393.
Palmieri, op. cit., p. 719; Pesch, op. cit., p. 370; Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116; Salaverri, op. cit., p. 716.
Palmieri, op. cit., pp. 719-20: “maxime probabile causas erroris deesse“; Pesch, op. cit., p. 370: “certitudine morali quadam latiore“; Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116; Sullivan, op. cit., p. 348; Salaverri’s certitudo relativa is identical with what others mean by certitudo moralis.
Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116 (quoting Maroto); Lercher, op. cit., p. 297; Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 348, 354; Salaverri, op. cit., pp. 716, 719, where he cites other authors.
Palmieri, op. cit., p. 719; Pesch, op. cit., p. 370.
Salaverri, op. cit., pp. 716, 720.
Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 348, 354.
Lercher, op. cit., p. 297.
Pesch, op. cit., p. 370.
Salaverri, op. cit., p. 719.
Palmieri, op. cit., p. 719.
Dieckmann, op. cit., p. 116 (again quoting Maroto); Salaverri, op. cit., p. 720; J. M. Herve, Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae, t. I (Paris: Berche & Pagis, 1934), p. 523.
Lercher, op. cit., pp. 298, 307; Salaverri, op. cit., p. 720.
Palmieri, op. cit., p. 721; cf., pp. 731-37.
Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 349-50; cf., pp. 331-40.
Sullivan, op. cit., p. 345.
Ibid., p. 350.
Ibid., p. 351.
Dieckmann, op. cit., pp. 117-18.
Pesch, op. cit., p. 370.
Lercher, op. cit., p. 297.
Ibid., p. 297.
Ibid., p. 307.
Collectio Lacensis, v. VIII (Freiburg: Herder, 1890), p. 401.
B. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory (Cambridge: University Press, 1955); H. Kiing, Structures of the Church (New York: Nelson, 1964), pp. 249-319. Cf., also the controversy about the force and significance of the “Sacrosancta” decree of the Council of Constance, e.g., in P. de Vooght, Les pouvoirs du Concile et iautorite du Pape au Concile de Constance (Paris: du Cerf, 1965), or the reviews of this book in 84 Downside Review (1966), pp. 432- 35, and in 40 Revue des Sciences Religieuses (1966), pp. 195-96.
The problem does not concern the Pope only as a persona privata; cf. A. Duval, De Suprema R. Pontificis in Ecclesiam Potestate, I, 1614, 19th edition (Paris: Lethielleux, 1877), 255-57.
See infra, chapter seven.
American Bishops’ Pastoral Statement, The Church in Our Day (January, 1968), Washington: U.S.C.C., pp. 69-73.
American Bishops’ Pastoral Statement, Human Life in Our Day (November, 1968) Washington: U.S.C.C., p. 18.
J. H. Cardinal Newman, Grammar of Assent (London: Longmans, 1906), p. 172.
Ibid., pp. 58-60.
Palmieri, op. cit., pp. 240-41.
Pesch, op. cit., pp. 193-94.
On the dangers of “juridicism” in the interpretation of Church documents, see Y. Congar, The Meaning of Tradition (New York: Hawthorne, 1964), pp. 120-24; W. Kaspar, Dogme et Evangile (Tournai: Casterman, 1967).

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