Preliminary Consideration Concerning the Nature and Function of the Magisterium

Chapter 3 from Dissent In and For the Church

The Term “Magisterium.” The term “magisterium” does not have a univocal meaning of long standing. In fact, it has only recently become common in the theological vocabulary. In general, the term describes the Church’s competence to teach and bear witness to the nature and consequences of God’s revelation in Christ. The subject and object of this competence, however, have not yet been theologically treated to an adequate degree. Even in the theoretical order many questions and problems have not been solved.

The magisterium is identified in varying ways throughout the history of the Church, depending on the prevailing ecclesiology, the notion of communications and the culturally conditioned views of authority and truth. Furthermore, the very notion of “teaching” is quite ambiguous. A teacher might be an authority figure who imposes information on passive students or, in accordance with another educational philosophy, he could be someone who leads students to understanding and does not content himself with merely reporting on past discoveries. In the face of such difficulties in specifying the scope of these preliminary considerations on the nature and function of magisterium in the Church, the most workable starting point for the present purposes seems to be a brief recall of the terminology and categories of the “manual” tradition.

Ordinary and Extraordinary Magisterium. A rather consistent terminology developed in the manuals with respect to the magisterium. Until Vatican II, the term “magisterium” was usually used to designate the hierarchical magisterium exclusively. The manifestations of the hierarchical magisterium were generally distinguished conceptually as “ordinary” or “extraordinary.” The extraordinary magisterium comprises the teachings of ecumenical councils or ex cathedra papal statements. It is taught that infallibility could attach to such teachings under certain rigidly defined conditions; infallibility could also reside in the ordinary magisterium, which includes anything in the realm of Christian faith and morals that is taught “unanimously” and as a matter of faith and morals by all the bishops in union with the pope.

Magisterium as Authoritative. Aside from the question of infallibility, which is being afforded extensive treatment in modern theology, the magisterium has been considered as having an important role in teaching doctrine that is “authentic” or “authoritative” but admittedly non-infallible. The term “authentic” itself has no well developed history as a “word of art” in theological interpretation. However, concerning authoritative teaching, Vatican II, in its Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, stated that an exercise of “authentic teaching authority” must be “acknowledged with reverence” and sincerely adhered to with “a religious assent of soul.” This assent is also described as “submission of will and of mind.” (1)

Role of the “Sense” of the Faithful. A broadly based “sense” in the Church, the sensus fidelium, however, has always been considered an important criterion of Christian truth along with the hierarchical magisterium. The very early tendency in the Church was to refer to the consensus of all believers as a safe test of orthodoxy. However, this was never understood to be a question of mere “majority rule.” The notion of the sensus fidelium shows a variety of historical forms depending on the theological and polemical context in which it is found.

Subject Exercising Magisterium

Entire Church as Magistral. The notion of magisterium is rooted in the promise of the Spirit of truth to the company of believers.

The basic proposition of the theology of the magisterium is, in Rahner’s words, that “the Church as a whole cannot fall from eschatological grace—hence from truth as grace either—because she is the concrete presence of the definitive self-assertion of God which has occurred in the God-Man.”(2) The promise of truth, then, primarily concerns “the church as a whole.” The Spirit was not promised only to the hierarchical ministry of the Church. “The body of the faithful as a whole, anointed as they are by the holy One, cannot err in matters of belief.”(3) Neither the magisterium nor the Church is simply hierarchical. Neither theologians nor Church officers may claim with any historical accuracy to be, in an exclusive sense, the magisterium.

Variety of Ministries. There can be no doubt as to the presence of ministries in the very early Church. The early Church was liberal in creating, shaping and even discarding ministries. There is, however, no indication of an original fixed set of clearly defined “offices” destined for all time. The lists of ministries (I Cor. 12:28-31; Rom. 12:6-8; Eph. 4:11) varied without apology. One person might claim to exercise several of these ministries. These ministries were not the primary reality around which the Church was structured but rather involved functions within the Christian life of service.

Development of the Role of Officers. As the Church took on a more definite form, the role of officers achieved more importance and precision. The tripartite division of officers, which we now simply assume, is first mentioned by Ignatius of Antioch in the early second century.(4) By the middle of the second century, the special role of the episcopate was clearly established. Communities such as the Roman Church, which were founded by an apostle, were considered important witnesses to genuine apostolic doctrine.

The theology of the discernment of the Spirit and the theology of office intertwine historically and present a polarity and tension that have still not been thematically resolved. The Church has persistently believed that it is not only its officers who are anointed by the Spirit. At times, however, the teaching prerogatives of the officers have been so stressed that the faithful seem graced only to accept and to obey. At other times the magisterial role of the Church at large has been emphasized.

Stress on Officers as Sole Subject Excercising Magisterium: Historical Stages. Congar states that a revolution in the notion of authority occurred at the time of the Gregorian reforms, when a highly juridical paradigm altered the conception of teaching authority.(5) Church officers, especially the pope (whose office in this period was much affected by what Weiler calls “totalitarian thinking”), came to be seen as possessing God’s authority rather than imperfectly reflecting it through delegation.(6) As a result, authority, at times, came to be seen as embodied in the officeholder, and the distinction between ecclesiastical and divine authority was blurred.

The reaction at the Council of Trent against the reformers brought about a more systematic stress on the power of officeholders. For centuries, the terms “revelation” and “inspiration” had not been used rather indiscriminately as descriptive of the ultimate source of the authority of teachings of popes and councils. After Trent, the term “assistance” was thought more descriptive of the guiding influence of the Spirit on Church officers. The notion of “assistance,” however, has never been precisely explained. (For Suarez, for example, it was “equivalent to revelation.”)(7) Despite the absence of theological explanation of this notion of assistance, the “assisted” magisterium of the hierarchy came to be seen more and more as the proximate rule of faith. In the eighteenth century, Billuart stressed that traditions do not constitute a rule of faith unless they have been proposed by a magisterium.(8) In the nineteenth century, the influential Franzelin distinguished between the preservation of truth in the whole Church and the binding promulgation of truth by the hierarchy.(9) Billot, reacting to the Modernist threat, assigned a critical role in preserving truth to the assisted hierarchical magisterium.(10)

The notion of assistance was basic to the definition of infallibility of Vatican I. D’Avanzo and Gasser, speaking for the Deputation of the Faith (the Commission charged with the drafting and presentation of proposed Conciliar texts), asserted that assistance is not a new revelation but a manifestation of the truth which is already contained in the deposit of revelation. Since a strict obligation in conscience binds the pope to seek out the truth in the faith of the living Church,(11) when the pope defines, he does so “in relation to the universal church,”(12) and “representing the universal church.”(13) Gasser states that a negligent pope would be impeded by God from a destructive and erroneous use of his powers.(14) The foregoing theories evidence a shift in the notion of teaching authority, from an aspect of the inherent power of the genetic Christian and apostolic experience to an attribute of the power of a proclaiming hierarchy. The term “vicar of Christ” had been first used to denote the Spirit (Tertullian),(15) and the phrase “Charism of truth” was used by Irenaeus not to describe the teaching power of Church officers (as it is in Vatican I and Vatican II) but to express the power of the truth itself.10 The meaning of the phrase “rule of faith” has also changed: “In the Fathers, regula fidei (rule of faith) refers to an object, the doctrine we must profess in order to receive baptism in the Church. For modern authors, regula fidei means the magisterium.”(17) “Teaching authority” in its early usage had reference to the totality of the original Christian experience and not merely to the notion of “the charism of office” as it is used in our modern sense. (18)

Other Factors Influencing the Definition of the Subject Exercising “Magisterium.” Despite the stress on office, other factors have influenced Church history in regard to the subject exercising magisterium. There were the ancient axioms: orbis major urbe (the whole church is greater than Rome alone), and “what affects all should be treated by all.” Moderate conciliar theories also emerged in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries stressing the magisterial role of the universal Church. These notions found blessing at the Council of Constance. From the early centuries, much importance was attached to the aforementioned sensus fidelium as a sign of truth.(19) This stress on what the universal Church believed did not amount to a kind of poll-taking or a statistical approach to truth. It was rather another way of stressing the presence of the Spirit in the whole company of believers.

The Christian realization that the Spirit of God is operative in the entire Church is also very clearly contained in the Russian theology of sobernost. This interesting theology relies heavily upon the thought of the early Church fathers in stressing unanimity in love.(20)

During the primacy of the universities in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the magisterium of the theologians was in high repute. The development of universities was the distinguished achievement of medieval Christian culture and was based on the premise that truth would emerge from the free exchange of ideas. Theologians whose ideas were thought too adventuresome (e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas) had the advantage of judgment by their university peers.

Teaching Role of Bishops in the Church. Acknowledgment of the special teaching office of bishops, however, is certainly part of authentic Christian tradition. In a true sense the bishops are in the Church as teachers. As Vatican II’s Decree on the Bishops’ Pastoral Office in the Church says, “Christ gave the apostles and their successors the command and the power to teach all nations, to hallow men in the truth and to feed them. Bishops, therefore, have been made true and authentic teachers of the faith, pontiffs, and pastors through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to them.” (21) This same document specifies this teaching role in the following words: “In exercising their duty of teaching—which is conspicuous among the principal duties of bishops—they should announce the Gospel of Christ to men.” (22)

It is, of course, clear that the bishops are called upon not merely to proclaim the gospel as it is found in Scripture but also to apply it as best they can to the problems of “civil society with its laws and professions, labor and leisure, the arts and technical inventions, poverty and affluence. . . . Finally, they should set forth the ways by which are to be answered the most serious questions concerning the ownership, increase, and just distribution of material goods, peace and war, and brotherly relations among all countries.” (23)

It is not, of course, presumed that the bishops will be able to apply the gospel vision to each and every complex problem of private and social morality in the modern world. It will always be necessary for the bishops, as for all other teachers in the Church, to enlist the assistance of experts in the various fields.

The Second Vatican Council also urged the bishops, in the discharge of their teaching task, to use every effective means of communication in order to proclaim the gospel of Christ: “They should also strive to make use of the various media at hand nowadays for proclaiming Christian doctrine, namely, first of all, preaching and catechetical instruction which always hold the first place, then the presentation of this doctrine in schools, academies, conferences, and meetings of every kind, and finally its dissemination through public statements at times of outstanding events as well as by the press and various other media of communication, which by all means ought to be used to proclaim the gospel of Christ.” (24)

Vatican II warned the laity against naive expectations that the pastors of the Church will be able to give clear cut answers to all complex problems: “Let the layman not imagine that his pastors are always such experts, that to every problem which arises, however complicated, they can readily give him a concrete solution, or even that such is their mission.”(25)

Because of the extraordinary developments in the field of communications resulting in the instant and widespread promulgation of doctrinal developments, many new pastoral problems present themselves to the bishops’ attention. In union with other Christians and with all those who fulfill the teaching office of the Church in any way, the bishops must give prime concern to “the pastoral aspect of theological publication.” (20)

Thus, the bishops have many special duties to perform as teachers in the Church. To prevent confusion, however, it must be noted that the bishops are not the only teachers in the Church, even though they are teachers in their own specific way. Teaching is an analogous term, and one kind of teaching competence must not be confused with another. Thus the bishops in their pastoral office of teaching the faith are not expected to master the analytical and methodological skills of the scientific theologian. Both bishops and theologians share a common concern for the integrity of the faith. Obviously, their distinct but complementary tasks should be executed in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

Object of the Magisterium

Doctrine of Faith or Morals. The First Vatican Council declared that the infallibility of the Church is directed to the revelation handed down by the Apostles.(27) The Church was to be, in Cajetan’s phrase, the “ministra objecti” (steward of the deposit).(28) The object of this stewardship, according to the First Vatican Council, contains “doctrinam de fide vel moribus” (doctrine of faith or morals). (29) The meaning of “moribus” in this definition is not clear. In its long history the expression “faith and morals” has had varied meanings. At the time of Trent, “morals” included the practices and customs of the early Church as well as points of liturgy, doctrine and discipline.(30) The allegation that it means “the natural law” is novel; the multiplicity of natural law theories complicates any such assertion. Nor is it meaningful to allege, as some have, that the natural law is contained implicitly or virtually in the deposit of faith.(31)

These problems, however, should not obscure the fact that the Church has always felt that its Christian experience is truly relevant to morality. The Church has always felt impelled to speak to the moral problems of man and to attempt to show how the experience of truth which gave birth to the Christian people relates to those problems. Recent theology is concerned with giving an increasingly important role to the Church in the moral dialogues that take place in the human community. Thus, no one questions the obligations of the Church to operate in the sphere of moral education. There is a question, however, as to the certainty that the Church can achieve when it applies its moral vision to the specific complex moral questions of any particular time.

Specific Morality as Object of Infallibility. The question of infallibility in teaching specific issues of morality is largely academic since theology does not offer any examples of such teaching. Professor Richard McCormick notes that this issue has provoked considerable discussion and states that there is “a growing body of opinion on both sides of this question.”(32) However, those who defend the possibility of infallibility in teaching morality do not produce specific historical instances in which such teaching has been promulgated. According to the guidance of Canon 1223, No. 3, of the Code of Canon Law nothing is to be considered defined “nisi id manifesto constiterit” (unless it is manifestly clear). There is no specific moral issue where this condition can be shown to obtain. There are no pronouncements on specific issues of morality that are defended as clearly infallible. Thus, in moral matters, the presumption is that the teaching is reformable and the possibility of licit dissent is logically contained in the notion of such inherently fallible doctrine. The question, then, of the moral magisterium involves the matter of authoritative, non-infallible teaching and the response due to such teaching.

It is clear in any event that the teaching of specific morality is not to be conceived of according to a juridical paradigm, as though teaching were understandable in terms of a legislative act.(33) Teaching is not “binding” because the teacher wills it to be binding but because it is convincingly true. The intellect is not bound by the will of another but by the appearance of truth presented in perceptible form.

Vatican II and Specific Morality .The Second Vatican Council teaches that those who fulfil the duty of teaching in the Church “should announce the gospel of Christ to men.” (34) The Council urges further that the message of the gospel be applied to all the important issues of human life involving man’s personal and social well-being. In general, it is recognized in the conciliar documents and in the general teaching of the Church that there is a specifically distinct ethical content in the Christian experience. This, however, does not mean that our traditional treasury of moral insight contains a detailed code for the regulation of all forms of human conduct. Many times, the genuinely Christian response to particular behavioural questions will be rather clear from the circumstances themselves. At other times, however, due to the mounting complexity of modern society, the problems will be marked by ambiguity and will appear to be open to diverse moral solutions. Vatican II acknowledges this in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World:

Often enough the Christian view of things will itself suggest some specific solution in certain circumstances. Yet it happens rather frequently, and legitimately so, that with equal sincerity some of the faithful will disagree with others on a given matter. Even against the inten¬tions of their proponents, however, solutions proposed on one side or another may be easily confused by many people with the Gospel message. Hence it is necessary for people to remember that no one is allowed in the aforementioned situations to appropriate the Church’s authority for his opinion. They should always try to enlighten one another through honest discussion, preserving mutual charity and caring above all for the common good.(35)

In other words, though the Christian moral experience may be easily identifiable in its broad and generic outlines, the application of that vision to changing circumstances introduces great possibilities of variety. Even though certain generic moral principles may have a lasting value, they will not always apply in the same way in every case. According to the influential statement of Aristotle, “the more demonstration becomes particular the more it sinks into an indeterminate manifold, while universal demonstration tends to be simple and determinate.” (36)

St. Thomas Aquinas also recognized, in accord with a strong scholastic tradition, that practical moral principles will not be found applicable in every type of case. Aquinas taught that practical moral principles are of such a nature that they are applicable in pluribus (“usually”) but that they will be deficient and not applicable in aliquo particulari (“in some special situations”). (37)

The Second Vatican Council shows that the problem of applying general moral doctrine to particular cases is becoming even more difficult in the modern world. The Council notes that we have moved to an evolutionary, dynamic view of the human situation; thus we are faced with ever new problems in the work of applying principle to context: “History itself speeds along on so rapid a course that an individual person can scarcely keep abreast of it. The destiny of the human community has become all of a piece, where once the various groups of men had a kind of private history of their own. Thus, the human race has passed from a rather static concept of reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one.” (38)

Indeed the Council was so aware of the new conditions of modern man that it said that “today the human race is involved in a new stage of history. . . . We can already speak of a true cultural and social transformation.”(39) In this new evolutionary and rapidly changing world the Church must acknowledge the possibility of lawful diversity in matters where perfect clarity cannot be achieved: “Such a mission requires in the first place that we foster within the Church herself mutual esteem, reverence and harmony, through the full recognition of lawful diversity.” (40) Vatican II also recognized the need for moral theology to take full account of the moral implications of the modern sciences. It urged moralists to blend modem science and its theories with the most recent discoveries in the area of Christian morality and doctrine (.41)

This inevitable diversity in the application of Christian wisdom to varying particular contexts means that usually there will be varying interpretations of what Christianity means in special cases. Everything that the Council has taught about the nature of this “new age” further emphasizes the need to keep debate open in complex issues. It means further that respectful dialogue is to be preferred to premature anathema.

The Maisterium and the Growth of Historical Consciousness

Historical Studies and the Proper Evaluation of Magisterium. The enlivened interest in historical studies in recent years has subjected many of the specific teachings of the Church to the scrutiny of sharp critical analysis. Historical studies have made theologians more aware of the many infelicitous specific teachings of the hierarchical magisterium in the past. These studies have not pointed out these errors and inadequacies in order to discredit the hierarchical magisterium but rather to make possible a realistic magisteriology that will properly reflect the true nature of the teaching and witnessing of the Church. It is the thinking of many theologians and historians today that it is necessary to understand fully the problems of the teaching Church in the past in order to develop a credible claim for a true teaching mission. The American Bishops, in their 1967 Pastoral Letter The Church in Our Day, point out that “those in apostolic office who violate the limits of their authority imperil the sense of community and diminish their effectiveness in echoing Christ authentically.” (42)

Some Examples of Theological Dissent in Patristic and Medieval Periods

Among the many possible examples of theological dissent in doctrinal matters in the patristic and medieval periods, the following five have been chosen because of their value in illustrating both the possibility of dissent and, in varying degrees, the diverse manner in which such dissent has been expressed and made public to the affected community of believers due to the variation in the historical contexts.

The three patristic instances (the cases of Popes Liberius, Vigilius and Honorius) are unfortunately almost invariably considered in terms of the use that was made of them as classic arguments against the notion of papal infallibility. Although the proceedings of the First Vatican Council and subsequent historical research have demonstrated the inconclusiveness of those three incidents as arguments against the technical definition of infallibility, a somewhat narrow, apologetical approach has overlooked the significance of those cases as important moments in the history of Christian dissent. The two medieval examples to be described bear no such polemical overtones and thus may be approached more directly. It would seem that each of these cases involves the manual theology definition of ordinary papal magisterium.(43) The actual conclusion or solution of the following disputes is not as important as the essential action-reaction rhythm of papal intervention and subsequent manifest ecclesial dissent.

Case of Pope Liberius (352-66). During the tangled period of ecclesiastical and political altercation after the Council of Nicaea in 325, the triumph of the Emperor Constantius II over his rivals in 351 tipped the balance in favor of the anti-Nicene party. As a part of his pro-Arian campaign, Constantius exiled the hitherto obdurate Pope Liberius. Liberius was returned to his See in 358 upon agreeing to the condemnation of Athanasius, the cornerstone of Nicene orthodoxy, and upon ascribing to the Formula of Sirmium. Most probably, Liberius ascribed not only to the First Formula of Sirmium (351), an indeterminate creed which repudiated Nicaea by suggestion, but also to the Third Formula (358) as well, which made use of the term homoiousion (like the Father), rather than the Nicene term of homoousion (the same as the Father) in reference to the Son. He did not subscribe to the definitely heretical Second Formula of Sirmium drawn up in 357. The major weakness of the Pope’s position, then, was a negative one: favouring the parties opposed to Nicaea by agreeing to a document which omitted the all-important homoousion.

The reaction in the West, still strongly pro-Nicaea, was immediate if not perduring due to the influence of imperial politics. The Synod of Rimini, meeting in July of 359, at first reaffirmed the creed of Nicaea and excommunicated the Arian leaders (it is interesting to note that Liberius did not take part in the Synod), but shortly thereafter bowed to the threats of Constantius and accepted another temporizing anti-Nicene creed. After the death of Constantius in 361, the creed of Nicaea gradually prevailed; it was solemnly redefined at the First Council of Constantinople in 381. Thus, although Liberius’ Letters in favor of the Formula of Sirmium were a weakness typical of many during this confusing period, they provoked quite rapid dissent on the part of the orthodox parties. (44)

The Case of Pope Vigilius (540-55). For political reasons, the Emperor Justinian (527-65) was seeking reconciliation with the Monophysites, a group ardently opposed to the definition of the Council of Chalcedon (451) concerning the two natures in Christ. He felt that he could best do this by condemning the Antiochene theology which had been the source of Nestorianism, the error condemned at the Council of Ephesus (431), which the Monophysites felt had come to life again in the decisions of Chalcedon. Thus in 544 Justinian condemned the Three Chapters (three works of the Antiochene School): the person and writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, certain writings of Theodoret of Cyrene and a letter of Ibas of Edessa. In 548 Justinian persuaded his protege, Pope Vigilius, to issue a similar condemnation, the Judicatum. Since the reaction in the West was strongly in favor of Chalcedon and the Three Chapters, Vigilius persuaded Justinian to summon a Council to discuss the matter. On May 14, 553, Vigilius issued a document, the First Constitutum, which supported the Western view on the Three Chapters, but to no avail. The Second Council of Constantinople (553), under the control of Justinian, renewed the condemnation of the Chapters and excommunicated Vigilius. On February 26, 554, Vigilius issued a Second Constitutum in which he recalled his former document and approved the acts of the Council.

The reaction in the West was strong and fairly rapid, considering the disturbed state of communications due to the Gothic War then raging in Italy. Opposition to Vigilius’ Judicatum was manifest among the deacons in Rome, but especially in Africa, where Bishop Facundus of Hermiane and others wrote defenses of the Chapters, and where a meeting of African Bishops in 550 declared Vigilius cut off from communion with the Church until he did penance. After the Council of 553, most of the West accepted the condemnation of the Chapters, but a schism did break out in northern Italy which was to last into the following century. The case of Pope Vigilius clearly illustrates that, even in matters of dogma as distinguished from morals, infallibility cannot be the note of every exercise of the papal magisterium and that theological dissent has expressed itself in rather strong terms at times. (45)

The Case of Pope Honorius (625-38). In this case the reaction to Papal error eventually led to the condemnation of heresies by Ecumenical Councils of the Church. Monenergism (one divine operation) and Monotheletism (one divine will) were the dialectical conclusions of the Monophysite movement, which had disturbed the East since the Council of Chalcedon. About the year 620, Sergius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, began to teach a doctrine of one divine operation and will in Christ. This position was attacked as being irreconcilable with the Decrees of Chalcedon, but Sergius appealed to Pope Honorius I. In 634 Honorius replied in two letters to Sergius which denied two contrary wills in Christ, refused to determine the question whether there were one or two operations in Christ and called for an end of discussion on the matter. Given the historical context and the tone of Honorius’ first letter, there is a definite teaching character to the action of the Pope. Although Honorius’ intentions may not have been heretical, he used expressions that were susceptible of an heretical interpretation, and his ban on further discussion would have prevented theologians from drawing correct theological deductions from Chalcedon.

Honorius’ letters did not stop the debate. They were used to support the imperial program favoring Monotheletism (e.g., the Ecthesis of Heraclius in 638 and the Typus of Constans II in 648); but more importantly, a continuing protest in the tradition of Chalcedon brought to light the weaknesses of the positions adopted by the Pope. This movement culminated in the Sixth Ecumenical Council held in Constantinople in 680-81. Here the Monothelite bishops were deposed and excommunicated and the intellectual leaders of the movement were anathematized and their writings burned; the letters of Honorius were also burned. The letters of Pope Leo II (682-83), and the Profession of Faith which each candidate for the papal throne during the Middle Ages was obliged to take, indicate papal acquiescence in this action. Clearly, in this instance, dissent beginning from theological reflection was not only notorious but achieved a notable magisterial effect (.46)

Pope Alexander III (1159-81) and Twelfth-Century Christology. The weaknesses of the Boethian definition of person (naturae rationabilis individua substantia: individual substance of a rational nature) caused difficulties in twelfth-century speculation on the manner of the union of two natures in Christ. Many theologians of the period felt that in order to maintain that Christ was one Person, the Divine Person of the Word, they would have to show that he was also one substance. In his Book of Sentences, Peter the Lombard had outlined three positions: (1) the homo assumptus (assumed man) theory: that Christ as man is both a person (aliquis: someone) and a substance (aliquid: something), but that man’s substance becomes God in the Hypostatic Union; (2) that there are three substances (divinity, body, and soul) in Christ, but only two natures and one person; and (3) the habitus (habit) theory: that the relation of human nature to the Word is similar to the relation of a habitus to a substance, and not of a substance to a substance. Some held that the Lombard favored this last position when he said that Christ as man is not aliquid, i.e., a substance. This statement has sometimes been called “Christological Nihilism,” but the name is a misnomer; the Lombard never asserted that Christ as man is nothing.

Roland Bandinelli, when a Master of Theology, had defended the third position stated by the Lombard, as did many other theologians of the day. Upon becoming Pope Alexander, Bandinelli changed his opinion and began an attempt to impose his new views upon the Church. At the Council of Tours (1163) he heard two propositions debated: (1) Christ is not aliquis homo (i.e., a human person and (2) Christ as man is not aliquid (i.e., a substance). The Council reached no conclusion as to these propositions. Pope Alexander, however, condemned the latter opinion in two letters in 1170 (Epistulae Cum in nostris and Eis qui); he renewed the condemnation in 1171 (Epistula Cum Christus). These condemnations laid the groundwork for a papal condemnation of the third proposition articulated by the Lombard.

Historians of this controversy have spoken of “the remarkably stubborn opposition to his decision.” (47) Until theologians could think their way past the Boethian definition of person in the latter part of the twelfth century, to say that Christ was a human substance seemed tantamount to saying that he was also a human person. Hence, there was a strong reaction on the part of those who adhered to the third position of the Lombard against the position adopted by Pope Alexander. The measure of this reaction can be gauged to some extent by the position of Peter of Poitiers favouring the third solution in his In Sent. IV, 10 (48) – written at the heat of the controversy, c. 1175 – and by the fact that, due to the remonstrances of the cardinals and bishops who agreed with this third position, Pope Alexander was compelled to remove the question from the agenda of the Third Lateran Council in 1179. In this case aggressive theological dissent delayed a papal intervention which could have been precipitous and dangerous had it come in advance of the necessary speculative groundwork. (49)

Thirteenth Century Condemnations of Aristotle. By far the greater part of the works of Aristotle had been translated into Latin by the beginning of the thirteenth century. The philosophy of Aristotle, particularly as filtered through Arabic thought, raised certain problems for Christian theology, problems not always solved in the most felicitous fashion, as the errors of Amaury of Bene and David of Dinant at the beginning of the thirteenth century indicate. Because of implication with these views, Aristotle’s libri de naturali sphilosophia (“books of natural philosophy,” including some of his most important works, such as Metaphysics, On the Soul, etc.) were forbidden to be taught in the Faculty of Arts under pain of excommunication by the Council of Paris in 1210, a ban which was renewed by the Papal Legate, Robert of Courcon, in 1215. Nonetheless, the interest in Aristotle’s works grew and even affected the Theological Faculty, as the letter of Pope Gregory IX to the Paris Theological Faculty in 1228 warning against the false use of philosophy in theology indicates. In 1231 Gregory once again forbade the use of the libri naturales until they could be purged of error, but the commission which he established for this work achieved nothing. The ban against these books was extended to the University of Toulouse by Innocent IV in 1245; as late as 1263, Urban IV confirmed the binding force of Gregory’s Statutes of 1231.

The frequent repetition of the ban alone indicates that there was strong pressure against its observation. Documentary evidence clearly indicates infringements of the local bans of 1210 and 1215. The papal ban seems to have had effect in Paris for a period of some years, perhaps until approximately 1240 (though it had no effect in Toulouse then and never had effect in Oxford), but it is clear that dissent from it had become common and quite public by about 1245, e.g., Roger Bacon’s Commentaries on Aristotle and Albert the Great’s extensive use of Aristotle’s works in his theological lectures. This dissent appears to have coexisted with a reaffirmation of the papal intervention, that of Innocent IV in Toulouse in 1245. By 1252, Aristotle’s De Anima was listed as a required text, and Thomas Aquinas, with his heavy dependence on the Stagirite, was already lecturing on the Sentences. By 1255, the whole of the Aristotelian corpus was part of the Paris curriculum. Admittedly, the evidence is fragmentary and the exact extent of the ban is somewhat problematic, but in practice a continuing dissent seems to have confronted a continuing papal condemnation for over a generation. The dissent had magisterial effect: in 1366 Urban V’s legates declared knowledge of the complete works of Aristotle to be necessary for the Degree of Licentiate of Arts. (50)

Issues concerning Which Authoritative Teachings Have Been Altered

Examination of the development of the magisterial position with respect to certain questions reveals the fundamental fact that the Church has changed its authentic teaching on central moral questions with the passage of time. In some instances the implication is clear that the change was necessary to correct a position that was wrong ab initio. The following examples of such changes are selected because they concern matters intimately related to truth, human life and the practical implications of man’s social nature.

Church on War and Peace. Throughout history the Church has held a variety of conflicting positions with respect to the legiti¬mate use of violence. Pre-Constantinian Christian literature took a strongly pacifistic position. Though this pacifism was untested for the most part and did not flow into practical pacifism in all situa¬tions, it revealed an extraordinary sensitivity to the horror of bloodshed. After Constantine, a new moral attitude toward war and military service developed. The sensitivity to military ser¬vice, which was so remarkable in the early Church that Celsus thought that all Christians were pacifists, completely disappeared. By the fifth century, in fact, only Christians were permitted to serve in the army.

The theology of war that animated the crusading period, under the instigation of Pope St. Gregory VII and Blessed Urban II, sought to establish the kingdom of Christ, centered in Jerusalem, by means of the crusading sword. In the spirit of the Crusades, the Decretum of Gratian held that to die in combat against the infidel is to merit heaven. War and violence were also used to attack heresy in the history of the Church. The teaching of the hierarchical magisterium in these periods, as well as the sensus fidelium, is not compatible with the great papal and con ciliar teachings on peace that have appeared in our day(.51)

Sexual Ethics. Pope St. Gregory the Great, in his prestigious Pastoral Rule, admonished couples that pleasure is not a fit purpose for intercourse and that if any pleasure is “mixed” with the act of intercourse, the married couple have transgressed the law of marriage; they have “befouled” their intercourse by “their pleasures.” (52) St. Gregory also wrote to St. Augustine, the Archbishop of Canterbury, teaching that married couples could not receive communion after marital copulation. The Pope said in this letter, which had enduring pastoral consequences, that it was as impossible to have intercourse without sin as it was to fall into a fire and not burn. Only a miracle could save one in any case. (53) These teachings are no longer advanced by the hierarchical magisterium.

The imposition of celibacy upon the clergy during the Hildebrandine reformation was motivated by multiple appeals to Scripture and Tradition in order to prove the inherent unworthiness of the sexual act. This coincided with the gradual degradation of the marriages and spouses of clerics: “We may rightly call them not spouses but rather concubines or whores.” (54) Pope Gregory VII was publicly opposed on the matter of clerical celibacy at the Synod of Paris (1074), the Synod of Mainz (1075), the Synod of Pavia (1076) and at Cambrai that same year. The opposition was a public dissent not only against the prudence of the rule but also contesting the truth of the reasoning. This same reasoning as a ground for the Church’s rule of clerical celibacy today was firmly rejected by Pope Paul VI in the recent Encyclical, Coelibatus Sacerdotalis.”(55)

In the twelfth century, Huguccio, Gratian’s chief commentator, taught that coitus “can never be without sin.” (56) Innocent III, an expert theologian in his own right, thought of this opinion as beyond question. By the twelfth century, the Augustinian doctrine about the need for procreative intention to free intercourse from sin was commonly accepted in the Church. It was affirmed strongly by the canonists and theologians of the thirteenth century and was not seriously contested in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was also commonly taught for centuries that intercourse during the time of menstruation was sinful. All of these opinions have since been challenged and abandoned. Until Vatican II, it was customary to refer to procreation and education of children as the primary end of marriage. (57) Due to advances in the appreciation of the other “ends” of marriage, this concession of primacy to one end was deliberately discontinued in Vatican II.

Condemnation of Interest Taking. The Council of Vienne (Fifteenth Ecumenical Council) condemned the taking of interest in very serious terms: “If anyone should fall into that error of pertinaciously presuming to affirm that interest taking is not a sin, we declare that he should be punished as a heretic.” (58) Two other Ecumenical Councils lent their authority to this teaching, Lateran II and Lateran III; four popes also made clear statements in support of this teaching: Alexander III, Urban III, Eugene III, and Gregory IX.

Theological dissent was communicated to the affected community contemporaneously with the authoritative bans. The banking community invented various financing arrangements to circumvent the prohibition. The challenge to the usury doctrine culminated in the effort of two theologians in the sixteenth cen¬tury, Dominic Soto and John Medina. One hundred years later a Roman congregation accepted their position; by the time of the great modern social encyclicals all scruples about taking legitimate interest had disappeared from the teaching of the magisterium.

Professor John T. Noonan, Jr., provided the Inquiry Panel with detailed information concerning the process of papal action and theological reaction in the question of interest taking (cf., pp. 536-549; 559-560, Transcript of the Proceedings). He emphasized the public dissenting role of the theologians with regard to specific Papal Bulls which condemned interest taking as a violation of divine natural and positive law (Cum Onus, 1569; In Earn, 1571; and Detestabilis Avaritiae, 1586). Although the communications media were limited, he testified that the ordinary medium of the time (public disputation) was commonly employed by theologians to discuss the question of interest taking and to debate the papal position. Furthermore, personal contact by the theologians with the community of the faithful directly affected by the papal teaching was common. Bankers consulted theologians and were informed of the various theological opinions concerning the question of interest taking. Sovereigns whose functions required them to frame laws on the subject of interest taking were advised of the theological positions on the subject. Apart from any rescinding of the papal position, Professor Noonan affirmed that theological dissent did effect a change in the teaching of the Church on interest taking. In addition, he indicated that, to his knowledge, no papal reactions were directed against the public style of dissent employed by theologians.

Moral Teaching concerning the Rights of the Accused. The Church also teaches by acting. In light of this, the following conclusion from a study by Patrick Granfield has considerable magisterial importance: “The ordeal, with its hot iron, molten lead, and boiling water, became commonplace. From the eighth to the thirteenth century, it was accepted by many local ecclesiastical courts with the approval of their bishops, who felt that it was a reliable way to discover the judicium Dei (judgment of God).” (59)

In 866, Pope Nicholas I had condemned legal torture as immoral. Subsequent practice and the Ad extirpanda of Pope Innocent IV, however, contradicted the teaching of Nicholas. Innocent IV accepted torture as a legitimate means for the interrogation of the accused. Until the publication of the Code of Canon Law, official Church teaching denied the right of silence or the right of non- self-incrimination (the American “Fifth Amendment” spirit) to the accused. With Canon 1743, No. 1, this doctrine was abruptly changed. Granfield suggests the explanation for this change: “It was the presence of a persistent, contrary theological opinion and a dramatic change in the civil law that finally influenced the Church.” (60)

Religious Liberty. Progress in the moral teaching of the Church concerning religious freedom is easily illustrated. In his Quanta Cura, Pius IX condemned “that erroneous opinion which is especially injurious to the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by our predecessor Gregory XVI deliramentum (derangement), namely, that freedom of conscience and of worship is the proper right of each man, and that this should be proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society.” (61) A striking change from this position is evident in the words of Vatican II: “The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person. . . . This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right.” (62)

Oriental Rites in the Church. Popes Clement VIII, Benedict XIV, Leo XII and Pius IX clearly and repeatedly taught the inferiority of the Oriental rites to the Latin rite. They were opposed, but opposition dissipated. The final rejection of Pius IX’s invitation to the Orthodox hierarchy to attend the First Vatican Council was largely due to the fact that the Oriental Churches had been victimized by centuries of Latin disdain. This attitude has finally been changed in the Decree of Vatican II for the Oriental Catholic Churches.

No pope did more to impose Latinizations upon Orientals in union with Rome than did Pope Pius IX. He modified almost every aspect of their traditional customs, ascetical practices and canonical discipline. After making sweeping Latinizations in the Armenian rite, Pius IX condemned those who cried out to preserve their rites, calling them deniers of the Primacy of the Vicar of Christ. (64)

The Decree of Vatican II on the Oriental Catholic Church condemns the Latinizations of the past in the strongest terms and enjoins the Orientals to restore their authentic traditions.

Pope Gregory XVI: Encyclical Letter, Mirari Vos. Some of the teachings of Pope Gregory XVI in his Encyclical Mirari Vos have been clearly reversed in the current century. Vatican II’s notion of Church reformation cannot be reconciled with Gregory’s viewpoint to this effect:

It is obviously absurd and most injurious to her [the Church] to demand some kind of “restoration and regeneration” as necessary for her existence and growth—as if it were possible for her to be subject to defect, to decay, or other such deficiencies.

Now from this evil-smelling spring of indiffenentism flows the erroneous and absurd opinion – or rather derangement – that freedom of conscience must be asserted and vindicated for everyone. This most pestilential error opens the door to the complete and immoderate liberty of opinions, which works such widespread harm both in Church and state.

This passage, and Pope Gregory’s references to “baneful liberty,” “insolent liberty,” “deleterious liberty,” cannot be reconciled with Vatican II’s teaching on the rights of conscience. For example, compare the following passages from Mirari Vos with the currently accepted notions of the rights of conscience and the complementary “right to know” in the Church:

Here reference must be made to that deleterious liberty, which can never be execrated and detested sufficiently, of printing and of publishing writings of every kind, which some dare to demand and to promote with such insolence.

Far different was the attitude of the Church in destroying the pestilence of evil books ever since the age of the apostles, for we read that they burned a large number of books publicly (Acts 19).

Boniface VIlI’s Unam Sanctam. Boniface VIII, in his Unam Sanctam (1302), taught that temporal authority should be subjected to the spiritual authority of the Church. He said: “We further declare, state, define, and pronounce as entirely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subjected to the Roman Pontiff.” (65) It would be unhistorical to suggest that Boniface here was merely asserting the ecclesial dimension of grace, or some palatable modern conception. Unam Sanctam was based on the writings of Aegidius Romanus who said: “Totum posse quod est in Ecclesia reservatur in summo pontifice” (all the power in the Church resides in the supreme pontiff).(66) The concept of papal sovereignty taught in Unam Sanctam is no longer taught.

Jews in Public Life. Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) taught that it was absurd for a Jew to have authority over Christians and banned Jews from public office. Jews were also required by that Council to wear distinctive dress, a prescription that was later extended to heretics, prostitutes and lepers.

This teaching was very influential in shaping the attitude of Christian Europe towards the Jewish people, and it is now seen as a factor in some of the persecutions of Jews that followed. Such teaching has, of course, been abrogated by the clear pronouncements of Vatican II regarding the Jewish people (.67)

Pius IX’s Syllabus or Summary of the Main Errors of Our Age (1864). Many of the teachings of the Syllabus have been contradicted. The following are examples of propositions condemned in the Syllabus:

“[That] the Roman Pontiff can and should reconcile and harmonize himself with progress, with Liberalism, and with modern civilization.” (68)

Error 77: “[That! In our time it is no longer expedient to recognize the Catholic religion as the sole religion of the state, to the ex¬clusion of any other forms of worship.” (69)

Error 78: “[That] Hence it is laudable in certain Catholic countries to provide by law for the people immigrating thither to be allowed publicly to practice their own religion, of whatever form it may be.” (70)

Error 79: “[That] For it is false that civil liberty for any kind of cult and likewise the full power granted to all of proclaiming openly and publicly any kind of opinions and ideas easily leads to cor-ruption of the minds and morals of nations and to the propagation of the plague of indifferentism.” (71)

The teaching office of the Church quite obviously no longer presses its condemnations of the foregoing propositions in light of Vatican II. It must be recognized that in the Syllabus, as well as in Mirari Vos and Quanta Cura, the Popes intended to condemn what they saw as dangerous trends: i.e., tendencies toward indifferentism, or attempts to justify outright denial of the truth. No doubt this explains the severe tone and approach of the documents. Nonetheless, the Decree on Ecumenism and the Declaration on Religious Freedom of Vatican II virtually contradict the foregoing citations word for word. Unquestionably, this indicates a definite development and advance in theological thinking on the questions of man’s dignity and his freedom and a real change in the teaching of the Church on the question of religious freedom and on the other matters at issue.

Question of Membership in the Church. Pius XII, in Mystici Corporis (1943) and again with more emphasis in Humani Generis (1950), insisted that the mystical body of Jesus on earth was simply identical with the Roman Catholic Church. In Humani Generis, the Pope insisted that his teaching on the matter was to settle the discussion among theologians. Vatican II has produced a different teaching. The theology adopted by Vatican II acknowledges the ecclesial reality of other Christian churches, and does not exclude that the Church of Christ in some way exists in them and, therefore, that the mystical body of Christ cannot be simply identical with the Roman Catholic Church (72)

Authoritative Teaching of the Biblical Commission. A Motu Proprio of 1907, issued by Pope Pius X, states: “All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Commission, which have been given in the past and which shall be given in the future, in the same way as to the decrees which appertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved by the Sovereign Pontiff.” (73) Particular decisions of the Biblical Commission include scores of points, exegetical and doctrinal, which are completely repudiated by many Catholic biblical scholars today.

Reflection: Error, Dissent, Revision

Dissent from certain hierarchical teachings of the past is an accepted fact in the Church. The teaching of Pope St. Gregory the Great on sexual ethics, of Urban II on the relationship between Christianity and violence, of Boniface VIII on the power of the papacy, of a series of popes on the nature of usury, of Gregory XVI and Pius IX on freedom of conscience, of Innocent III on the treatment of Jews and of Innocent IV on the use of torture—all offer examples of positions seriously taught and since abandoned. Despite the different problems that existed at the time of the foregoing teachings and the different universe of discourse in which they were discussed, it is impossible to show that these teachings were “correct in their time.” There were other views of the papacy when Boniface VIII wrote; there were other views on religious liberty when Gregory XVI produced his Mirari Vos. The vigor of repetition of many of the foregoing hierarchical teachings bears witness to the fact that other opinions were obtaining some contemporary prominence. These other views survived the papal condemnations to the extent that the Church at large now dissents from the papal teachings in question.

It would be gratuitous to assert that only the passage of time justifies dissent. The error should be corrected when it is detected. The passage of time may be a condition for dissent on issues that have not been adequately examined, but it would be a disservice to truth to insist on the passage of time to justify dissent with respect to issues that have had the advantage of extended and prolonged discussion.

In view of this history, therefore, normal hermeneutical and theological principles should be followed in assessing the value of a particular papal document. Thus, while the exact determination of the papal author’s intention is an important hermeneutical factor, yet the manifest mind and will of the writer (in these cases, the pope) can never be the only criterion of truth. To consider the intentions of the pope as exclusively decisive of the truth and value of a teaching leads to an unrealistic positivism and a crass voluntarism. Indeed, since the pope does not teach other than what he thinks and wishes to be followed, making his “mind” and his “will” determinative of the possibility of legitimate dissent would virtually eliminate the distinction between fallible and infallible teaching contrary to Vatican I and II. The criterion of the “manifest” mind and will of the pope is properly employed to distinguish formal encyclicals from remarks at a papal audience, the former to be given great weight by the faithful, and the latter to be considered as simply relevant data.

Professor Noonan’s testimony concerning the sixteenth-century controversy over interest taking illustrates the relative importance of the determination of the papal intention as a hermeneutical factor. Although the Papal Bulls of Saint Pius V indicate the Pope’s conviction that he was performing an apostolic task by articulating the divine natural law and the positive law on the problem of interest taking, contemporary theologians disagreed with the papal assertion that this was a question of divine natural law. They asserted the question involved merely positive law and pointed to the non-acceptance of the papal condemnation as an indication of the positive law stance of interest taking. Professor Noonan’s testimony indicated that although the papal intention was one important element in the interpretation of the papal position, it was not the decisive element in determining the status of interest taking as a question of natural law as opposed to positive law.

The Encyclical as a Genre of Magisterial Teaching

The Constitution on the Church does give great interpretive importance to the “manifest mind and will” of the Pope, but this is not the only, or completely independent, criterion of truth. “His mind and will in the matter may be known either from the character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking.”(74) Consequently, analysis of papal teachings should include consideration of the nature of an encyclical, which is the type of document in which Paul VI enunciated his ban on artificial contraception.

A Recent Phenomenon. The papal encyclical, as known today, is a recent phenomenon. Although related to other ecclesiastical literary forms such as Bulls, Apostolic Constitutions and Papal Briefs, the encyclical is a distinct literary genre. Because it is a modern development, the issues raised by the encyclical form— its importance, its doctrinal character, its permanency—have become the objects of scholarly consideration only recently. Because the encyclical is an ecclesiastical literary form, the interpretation of a specific encyclical is subject to the canons of higher criticism as well as the general norms used to evaluate any magisterial docu-ment.

Origin and Development. Some find prototypes of papal encyclicals in antiquity, in the letters that Rome addressed to various patriarchs announced their election to one another. Etymologically, the encyclical suggests the idea of a “circular” (Greek: en-kyklos) addressed to a wide audience.

The present form and use of the encyclical originated in the eighteenth century. In 1728 Francisco Domenico Bencini published a treatise, De litteris encyclicis, in which he proposed the use of encyclical letters as a means to safeguard the unity and purity of faith and morals. He cited circular letters as an effective means whereby the primitive churches had been able to insure the antiquity, universality and unity of faith against innovations and novelties.

Bencini was a contemporary of Prospero Lambertini who, as Pope Benedict XIV (1740-1758), issued the first encyclical of modern times. Benedict’s Ubi Primum, addressed to his “venerable brothers, Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops,” re-established the ancient custom of inaugural letters. In one way or another, the inaugural encyclicals, from Ubi Primum of Benedict to Ecclesiam Suam of Paul VI, stress the close ties between the See of Peter and the rest of the episcopate and emphasize the need for a common policy in governing the church and a united front against the errors of the day. Benedict XIV is responsible for another innovation: He had his encyclicals included in the register of official correspondence—the Bullarium—side by side with Apos-tolic Constitutions, Bulls and similar documents. In the example of Bencini, Pope Benedict explained that encyclical letters, addressed to his fellow bishops, were intended, as in ancient times, to safeguard the unity of faith and morals.

Although Benedict’s immediate successors made some use of the genre, it was only in the 19th centuary that the flow of encyclicals became steady. Gregory XVI (1831-1846) and Pius IX (1846- 1878) published numerous encyclicals on a variety of timely topics, social as well as religious. Pointing out dangerous trends, their letters set down guidelines for the maintenance and restoration of a Christian society. The eighty-six encyclicals issued by Leo XIII (1878-1903), by all accounts, broke new ground for the Church in the modern world. His directives had a contemporaneity which those of his predecessors lacked. It is not to minimize the writings of Pius X or Benedict XV to give credit to Leo XIII, Pius XI and Pius XII for raising the encyclical form to its present level of prestige and importance. No one, cleric or lay, Catholic or otherwise, concerned with an application of Christian principles to contemporary issues can ignore them.

In the two centuries since Benedict’s Ubi Primum, encyclicals have become more stylized, while at the same time varying widely in form, length and scholarship. A recent innovation first appeared in John XXIlI’s Pacem in Terris: besides addressing it to “patriarchs, primates, archbishops, bishops, and other local ordinaries in peace and communion with the Apostolic See, to the clergy and faithful of the whole world,” as was customary, Pope John addressed it also “to all men of good will.” Pope Paul VI used the same salutation in Ecclesiam Suam and Humanae Vitae.

If the audiences to whom encyclicals are addressed have expanded over the years, so have the topics they discuss. The encyclicals—with very few exceptions—have been issued to give guidance in almost every field of human endeavor. An unmistakable pastoral concern, found in all modern encyclicals, is probably their most distinguishing note. Although it is not always obvious to the general reader, it is almost axiomatic to the professional theologian and historian that passages in every encyclical are directed, however obliquely, to specific questions. There is genuine danger of distorting an encyclical if it is exegeted apart from the historical circumstances and context which brought it into being. Humanae Vitae is an obvious example.

Authority of Papal Encyclicals. Given the fact that the encyclicals represent a modern development, it is understandable that the question of their doctrinal import is also of recent origin.

Around the turn of the century in France, a minor controversy developed about encyclicals. Msgr. Perriot proposed that they represent dogmatic judgments and are, therefore, expressions of the infallible teaching authority of the Holy Father.(75) L. Choupin argued against extending the umbrella of infallibility to papal en-cyclicals. (76) A consensus has emerged.

One of the few monographs on encyclicals is by Dom P. Nau, (77) who is certainly no minimalist with respect to papal authority. He asserts that a majority of theologians do not consider encyclicals infallible statements. They are not ex cathedra definitions. Theologians are satisfied, according to Nau, to claim for them authority similar to that enjoyed by the decrees of the Sacred Congregations, that is, the duty of total compliance (obéissance) on the part of Catholics. Pope Pius XII addressed himself to the authority of encyclicals in an encyclical, Humani Generis: He allows that “in writing such letters the popes do not exercise the supreme power of their teaching authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority (of the popes).” (78)

It is commonly held in the standard texts (auctores probati) that papal encyclicals are statements of the ordinary magisterium. They are expressions of the teaching office carried on in normal circumstances, with varying degrees of reflection, scholarship and definitiveness. Historically, it is significant that the gradual explicitation of the distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary teaching of the pope coincides with evolution of the encyclical genre. It is significant, theologically as well as historically, that a direct quote from Humani Generis, which appeared in the original schema De Ecclesia et de B. Maria Virgine at Vatican II, was deleted in the final draft. In the text quoted in the first draft, Pius XII had asserted that once the pope goes out of his way to speak on a controverted subject, “this subject can no longer be regarded as a matter for free debate among theologians.”(79)

While a practicing Catholic is expected to comply with papal teaching however it is communicated, his assent is, by definition, proportionate to the context and content of the pope’s expression. The response due a solemn, infallible pronouncement is quite other than the adherence owed to a noninfallible (and, therefore, presumably a reformable) statement. There are authors who say that the pope might use an encyclical as a vehicle for an infallible, ex cathedra pronouncement, but Professor Lambrus chini made it clear that Humanae Vitae is not such a pronouncement.

Reform and Development. Although papal directives have, over the years, closed off certain avenues of debate, they were never intended to forestall legitimate development, nor have they in fact impeded progress. G. K. Malone, in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, cites an address of Paul VI to a group of cardinals on June 23, 1964, to illustrate that even the popes themselves regard certain teachings pertaining to the ordinary magisterium as reformable.(80) Paul VI is quoted as saying that he felt some of the teachings of Pius XII were still valid until “he felt obliged to change them.” If disagreement in practice or in preaching is to be labeled, in a limited vocabulary, a “dissent,” then those “obligations” to truth which have moved, and which continue to move, popes and councils to alter or abandon former authoritative pronouncements must take their roots in what is called “dissent.” Dissent founded on the search for truth is truly part of the magisterial process.

In conclusion, it is well to recall that the Church has always believed in the active presence of the Spirit of God. To discern the teaching influence of the Spirit, varying and contradictory criteriologies have developed in the history of the Church. At times there have been exaggerated claims for the reliability of the sensus fidelium; at other times, especially in recent centuries, excessive claims have been made suggesting an aggrandized teaching authority residing in councils and Church officers. In the face of this trend toward establishing an exclusive teaching prerogative in the hierarchy, recent historical studies have exercised a modifying influence by pointing out the presence of error in past papal and episcopal teaching and the correction of error by way of theological dissent. Dissent thus appears traditionally as one possible, responsible option in the theological task, and, in its own way, is an intrinsic element in the total magisterial function of the Church. The entire Church, as truly magistral, can never be contained simply and exclusively in what has become known as the hierarchical magisterium.

Notes

Vatican II, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium), para. 25.
H. Vorgrimler and K. Rahner, Theological Dictionary (New York: Herder, 1965), p. 268.
Vatican II, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, para. 12.
H. Küng, Structures in the Church (New York: Nelson, 1964), p. 207.
Y. Congar, “The Historical Development of Authority in the Church,”
in J. M. Todd, ed., Problems of Authority (Baltimore: Helicon, 1964), pp. 136-140; Congar, Tradition and Traditions (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 134-137.
A. Weiler, “Church Authority and Government in the Middle Ages,”
in Concilium, vol. 7 (Glen Rock: Paulist Press, 1965), p. 131.
F. Suarez, De Fide, III, Sect. 2, n.n in Vives edition of Opera, vol.12, p. 100.
C. R. Billuart, Cursus Theologiae, Tract. De Regulis Fidei, Diss. II,1; cf., DTC, XV, c. 1328.
J. B. Franzelin, De Divina Traditione et Scriptura, second edition (Rome, 1875), thesis XI.
L. Billot, De Sacra Traditione contra novam Haeresim Evolutionismi (Rome, 1904).
J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio,ed., H. Welter (Paris-Leipzig, 1903), 52:764, 1213-14 (herein¬after cited as Mansi).
Mansi, loc cit., esp. 1214.
Ibid.
Ibid
De Virg. Vel., 1 (P.L., 2, 889-890).
Adversus Haereses, IV, 26, 2 (P.G. 7, 1053-54).
Y. Congar, Tradition and Traditions (New York: Macmillan, 1967),P.331.
Ibid., pp. 119-37.
Ibid., pp. 338-347; PP- 36, 49, 55, 203, 316.
R. Murray, “Collegiality, Infallibility and Sobernost,” One in Christ,1 (1965), PP.19-42.
Vatican II, Decree on the Bishops’ Pastoral Office in the Church, para. 2.
Ibid., para. 12.
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 13.
Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, para. 43.
Cf. G. K. Malone, “Academic Freedom Revisited,” Chicago Studies, 7 (1968), pp. 3-13.
Denz., 3069.
In II-II, q. i, a. 1, nn. X and XII.
Denz., 3073.
J. L. Murphy, The Notion of Tradition in John Driedo (Milwaukee:Seraphic Press, 1959), pp. 292-300.
I. Reed, “Natural Law, Theology, and the Church,” Theological Studies, 26 (1965), p. 55.
R. McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology,” Theological Studies, 26 (1965), p. 614.
Helpful for understanding the peculiar problems of the magisterium dealing with morality is the essay of J. G. Milhaven, “Towards an Epistemology of Ethics,” Theological Studies, 27 (1966), pp. 228-41.
Vatican II, Decree on the Bishops’ Pastoral Office in the Church, paragraph 12.
Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, paragraph 43.
Posterior Analytics, I, 24, 86a, 4.
Summa Theologica, I—II, q. 94, aa. 4 and 5.
Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, paragraph 54.
Ibid., para. 4.
Ibid., para. 92.
Ibid., para. 62.
The Church in Our Day (Washington: U.S.C.C., 1968), p. 35.
Cf. e.g., F. A. Sullivan, De Ecclesia, I: Quaestiones Theologiae Fundamental (Rome: Gregorian University, 1963), pp. 343-44.
Cf. K. Bihlmeyer and H. Tuechle, Church History, vol. I: Christian Antiquity (Westminister: Newman, 1958), pp. 250-56; P. Hughes, A History of the Church, vol. I (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1947), pp. 208-13; Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 331-32; E. Amman, art. “Libère,” DTC, IX, c. 631-59.
Cf. Bihlmeyer-Tuechle, op. cit., pp. 292-95; Hughes, op. cit., pp.278-85; Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 332-35; E. Amman, art., “Affaire des Trois-Chapitres,” DTC, XV, cc. 1868-1924.
Cf. Bihlmeyer-Tuechle, op. cit., pp. 295-99; Hughes, op. cit., pp. 292-302; Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 336-37; E. Amman, art., “Honorius I,” DTC, VII, cc. 93-132; B. Lonergan, De Verbo Incarnato (Rome: Gregorian University, 1961), pp. 184-96: 202-06.
N. Haring, “The Case of Gilbert de la Porreé, Bishop of Poitiers (1142-54),” Medieval Studies, 13 (1951), p. 39. (1142-54),” Medieval Studies, 13 (1951), p. 39.
P.L., 211, 1176.
Mansi, 22:458; cf., Haring, art. cit., pp. 1-41, esp. pp. 26-39.
Cf. M. Grabmann, “I divieti ecclesiastici di Aristotele sotto Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX,” in Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, V, fasc. I (Rome: Gregorian University, 1941); M. D. Chenu, Towards Understanding St. Thomas (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), pp. 31-39; F. Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West (Louvain, 1955), pp. 66-100; 108-11.
For a highly documented review of the diverse attitudes toward war and violence that have existed historically in the universal Church at large and in the teaching of the hierarchical magisterium, see R. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (Nashville: Abingdon, 1960).
Regula Pastoralis, 3:27; in P.L., 77:102.
Epistulae, 11:64, in, 77:1196-97.
Peter Damian, in Opusc. XVIII, Diss, iii, c. 3.
M. Boelens, Die Klerikerehe in der Gesetzgebung der Kirche (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 1968), pp. 142-152.
Summa, 2.32.2.1.
Code of Canon Law, c. 1013, I.
Denz., 906.
P. Granfield, O.S.B., “The Right to Silence: Magisterial Development,” Theological Studies, 27 (1966), p. 404.
Ibid., p. 420.
Denz., 1690 in older editions.
Vatican II, Declaration on Religious Freedom, para. 2.
W. DeVries, Rom und die Patriarchate des Ostens (Freiburg-Muenchen:Verlag Karl Alber, 1963); A. Petroni, “An sit ritus praestantior?” Apollinaris, 6 (1933), pp. 74-82.
Apostolic Letter, “Quo impensiore,” May 20, 1870.
Denz., 875.
De Ecclesiae Potestate III, 9, ed., R. Scholz (Weimar, 1929).
Vatican II, Declaration on the Relation of the Church to non-Christians,”
cf. commentary by J. Oesterreicher, in H. Vorgrimler, ed., Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol. 3 (New York: Herder, 1968), which also contains a bibliography on the vexed history of Jewish-Christian relations.
Denz., 2980.
Denz., 2977.
Denz., 2978.
Denz., 2979.
See C. Hay, “The Ecclesiological Significance of the Decree on Ecumenism,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 3 (1966), pp. 343-53; P. Chirico, “One Church: What Does It Mean?” Theological Studies, 28 (1967), pp. 659-82.
Pius X., Motu Proprio, “Praestantia Scripturae,” Nov. 18, 1907; Denz. 3503.
Constitution on the Church, para. 25.
Cf. L’Ami du Clergé (1903), pp. 196, 200.
L.Choupin, Valeurs des Décisions Doctrinales et Disciplinaires du Saint-Siège (Paris, 1907).
P. Nau, Une Source Doctrinale: Les Encycliques (Paris: Les Editions du Cedre, 1952), p. 59.
Pius XII, Humani Generis (Washington: NCWC, 1950), p. 10.
Cf. infra., pp.
C. K. Malone, “Encyclicals,” New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 5 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 332.

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