The Reasonableness of Reponsible Dissent from One Particular Ethical Teaching of the Encyclical

Chapter 6 from Dissent In and For the Church

The Statement by Theologians takes exception to the absolute ban on artificial contraception proposed in Humanae Vitae primarily because of an “inadequate concept of natural law” which serves as the basis of the proposed ethical conclusion of the Encyclical. This chapter will explicitly point out the defects in such an understanding of natural law and also develop in more detail the specific shortcomings in the moral methodology implied in the Encyclical. There is no detailed development of a particular line of reasoning which would argue against the absolute condemnation of the Encyclical. This chapter only intends to point out the different approaches which have been used by some Roman Catholic theologians in coming to conclusions which admit the need of artificial birth control in some circumstances.

The historical development of the teaching on contraception will be summarized to show how historical and cultural factors do influence a particular moral teaching. In particular, the history of the growing dissatisfaction among Catholic thinkers with the teaching on contraception as it has developed since Casti Connubii in 1930 will also document the reasonableness of dissent from the specific conclusion of Humanae Vitae. The Statement by Theologians concludes “that spouses may responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and foster the values and sacredness of marriage.” But in the context of the whole Statement, this cannot be construed as a simplistic argument based on the universal rights of conscience. The Statement maintains that in certain circumstances artificial contraception is not wrong and that the conscience of the couple must decide when this is a valid ethical judgment, after considering all the values which are present, in much the same fashion as an older Catholic theology taught about the personal conscience decision to use rhythm.

Natural Law and Humanae Vitae

 

DEVELOPMENT IN NATURAL LAW THEORY RECOGNIZED BY CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGIANS

Pluralism of Natural Law Theories. Not all thinkers have meant the same thing by the term “natural law.” Nor are all natural law theoreticians in agreement concerning which actions are opposed to the natural law.

Aristotle considered nature as the intrinsic principle in every living organism which is teleological, dynamic and specific. Whereas Aristotle stressed the individual substance as the principle of intelligibility, the Stoics looked upon the universe as a whole as the principle of intelligibility. For the different Stoic theoreticians, natural law had merely a generic meaning, much like our “morality.” Roman law (per Ulpian) defined the natural law as that which is common to man and all the animals, as distinguished from the ius gentium which is proper to man because of his reason. Gratian, the monk who codified the laws of the Church in the twelfth century, described the natural law in an historical perspective as that “which is contained in the law and the Gospel.”

Thomas Aquinas, in citing these and other definitions of the natural law, thus illustrates the ambiguity and pluralism existing in the theory of natural law. Aquinas himself struggled with the characteristics of the natural law: universality, immutability and indispensability. In theory, he admitted that the general principles of the natural law (e.g., good is to be done; act according to right reason) are always binding. However, he held that the conclusions of the common principles (e.g., what is owed must be returned) oblige only generally (ut in pluribus), because other considerations could change the validity of the conclusion as the analysis becomes further removed from the first principles. Contemporary Thomists similarly advance their own different approaches to the question of natural law. They emphasize that natural law is right reason and condemn overly legalistic approaches to natural law.(1) Thus, for the greater part of the history of the Church, natural law has not signified a coherent philosophical system with an agreed body of ethical content.(2)

Catholic Moral Theology and Natural Law. Since natural law is not a monolithic philosophical system with an agreed-upon body of ethical content, Catholic moral teaching cannot be said to be based on the natural law. The greater part of Catholic moral teaching on particular points was arrived at long before Thomas Aquinas articulated his theory of natural law in the thirteenth century. His theory merely explained in a coherent way the already existing moral teaching on a number of particular points.

Generally, only in the last hundred years has Catholic teaching in the hierarchical magisterium been explicitly based on natural law reasoning, particularly in respect to medical morality and social ethics. However, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World of Vatican II appears purposely to avoid the term “natural law,” which occurs only twice in this long document devoted to social ethics. (3)

The moral teaching of the Church, de iure, can never be tied to any one philosophical system and understanding of man. The sovereign freedom of the Word of God can never be totally dependent on any one philosophical approach.

Danger of Physicalism: Biological and Physical Aspects as Primary Determinants of Morality. Catholic moral theology generally avoids identifying the morality of an act with the physical structure of the act itself. For example, the physical act of killing is not always wrong, whereas the moral act of murder is always wrong. To identify the moral act totally in physical or biological terms seems to be a distortion of morality. Historically, there are two main sources of this aberration. As noted, Ulpian, in the third century, defined the natural law as that which is common to man and all the animals. He differentiated the natural law from the ius gentium, the law proper to man because of his reason. To him, the word nature meant those things which are common to man and all the animals. Consistent with this terminology, Thomas Aquinas and the other scholastics employed the word nature to describe actions totally in biological terms. For instance, in the matter of chastity, Thomas divided all sins into two categories: sins against nature—those in which the biological process of the depositing of male semen in the vagina of the female is not observed (masturbation, homosexuality and bestiality), and sins according to nature—those in which the biological process is perfect, but a specifically human element is missing (fornication, adultery and sacrilege). The anthropology underlying such analysis considers man as a layer of rationality atop a layer of animality: the animality retains its own structure and finality and cannot be interfered with in the name of rationality. The teaching that procreation is the primary end of marriage (a teaching no longer maintained in recent statements of the hierarchical and papal magisterium) is logically connected with the approach of Ulpian, since procreation is common to man and all the animals, whereas the love-union aspect of marriage is proper only to men.

In a more primitive understanding of reality in a nontechnical and non-scientific society, happiness was truly found by conforming oneself to nature and the laws of nature. This attribute of a non- scientific culture was definitely reflected in the natural law theory of the Stoics. However, scientific and technological man has the power to interfere with nature precisely to make human life more human.(4)

The Shift from Classicism to Historical Consciousness and Its Effects in Moral Theology. The classicist world view sees reality in terms of eternal, immutable and unchanging reality. The historical world view sees reality more in terms of growth, change and development. Two different methodologies correspond to these two different perspectives:

The classicist methodology emphasizes the abstract, the a priori and the deductive.

Historically conscious methodology emphasizes the concrete (it does not deny the absolute need for metaphysics, but pays more attention to the concrete, the particular and the historical), the inductive and the a posteriori.

The documents of Vatican II reflect both tendencies, but for the first time there is an emphasis on an historically conscious methodology. This is illustrated in the call to begin reading “the signs of the times”; in the understanding of the Church as a pilgrim Church constantly in need of reform and change; and in the call for dialogue with other Christians, non-Christians and even atheists in the continual, ongoing search for truth.

The differences between the approaches of classicism and historical consciousness are further evidenced in the following areas:

A more historically minded approach realizes the need for change without canonizing every change possible.

An historically conscious approach stresses inductive reasoning, the empirical sciences and the experience of Christian people in moral matters.

A classicist approach makes absolute certitude the ideal; the more historically minded approach realizes that man must be satisfied with a lesser degree of certitude.

A classicist approach considers the magisterium’s pronouncements somewhat abstracted from historical circumstances, whereas the historically conscious approach views the teachings of the magisterium as limited by their historical and cultural circumstances and open to further growth and change.

A classicist approach sees reality primarily in terms of essences and substances, whereas the historically conscious approach sees reality more in terms of relationships and development.

An historically conscious approach realizes that “subjectivity” enters into “objectivity” itself. Transcendental methodology sees objectivity not merely in terms of “the object out there” but in terms of the objectivity of the human knowing process itself.(5)

Newer Approaches in Catholic Ethical Theory. The traditional teaching on natural law enshrines two important values that Catholic moral theology must retain. There is a source of ethical wisdom and knowledge, apart from the explicit revelation of God in Christ in the Scriptures, which Christians share with all mankind. Also, morality cannot be based on an individual’s whims or fancies. However, many contemporary Catholic theologians have expressed dissatisfaction with the concept of natural law as found in the manuals of moral theology.

There have been many developments in Catholic theology and philosophy in the last few decades and these newer insights necessarily have theoretical and practical consequences for a proper understanding of natural law. From a theological perspective, the need for a “theology of compromise” is shown by the danger of making an ideal into an absolute norm for all and by a consideration of the reality of sin and its effects on man’s actions.

From a philosophical perspective, differences between a substantialist approach and a more relational approach, as illustrated by the example of lying and the changed understanding of the reason for its malice, would result in different practical conclusions. The new viewpoint which does not define the moral action in terms of the physical or biological structure of an action seen merely in itself, apart from the vital relationships surrounding it, will have many practical repercussions. Differences between the notion of objectivity in the older approaches and the notion of objectivity in the transcendental philosophy which is being proposed by many Catholics today (e.g., Rahner, Lonergan, Coreth) (6) will also affect concrete ethical judgments. The current literature in moral theology (e.g., Johann, Simons, van der Marck, Boeckle and Schueller) illustrates such newer approaches and different conclusions . (7)

There exists a plurality of different philosophical understandings of man and his actions. On the specific question of contraception, these different philosophical understandings—personalism, a more relational approach and transcendental method— would arrive at solutions different from the absolute condemnation of artificial contraception contained in Humanae Vitae.

Natural Law as Employed in the Encyclical Humanae Vitae (8)

Pope Paul’s Encyclical Humanae Vitae explicitly employs a natural law methodology to arrive at its particular moral conclusions on the licit means of regulating births. The Encyclical admits that the teaching on marriage is a “teaching founded on natural law, illuminated and enriched by divine revelation” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 4). The Encyclical then reaffirms that “the teaching authority of the Church is competent to interpret even the natural moral law” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 4).

The conclusions of the Encyclical receive their force, according to the Encyclical, both from the reasoning on which they are based and from the teaching authority of the Pope, which enjoys the special assistance of the Holy Spirit. In paragraph 12 the Encyclical states: “That teaching, often set forth by the magisterium, is founded upon the inseparable connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning. Indeed, by its intimate structure, the conjugal act, while most closely uniting husband and wife, capacitates them for the generation of new lives, according to laws inscribed in the very being of man and of women. . . . We believe that the men of our day are particularly capable of seizing the deeply reasonable and human character of this fundamental principle.” (Emphasis added.)

Though, in paragraph 28, priests are reminded “that obedience, as you know well, obliges not only because of the reasons adduced, but rather because of the light of the Holy Spirit, which is given in a particular way to the pastors of the Church in order that they may illustrate the truth,” nonetheless, natural law argumentation was employed in the Encyclical; and such argumentation contains certain defects.

Failure to Admit Plurality of Natural Law Theories. The reasoning in the Encyclical does not admit that there is a pluralism in understandings of the natural law and in the conclusions which can be derived from different natural law theories. The impression lingers in Humanae Vitae that the natural law is a coherent philosophical system with an agreed-upon body of content.

Physicalism. The notion of natural law employed in the Encyclical appears to involve a “physicalism” in identifying the moral act with the physical and biological structure of the act itself. (Note that the fact that the moral aspect of the act may coincide with the physical structure of the act is not denied in this presentation.) The core practical conclusion of the Encyclical states: “We must once again declare that the direct interruption of the generative process already begun, and above all directly willed and procured abortion, even if for therapeutic reasons, are to be absolutely excluded as licit means of regulating birth” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 14). “Equally to be excluded … is direct sterilization …. Similarly excluded is every action which, either in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 14). The footnotes in this particular paragraph refer to the Catechism of the Council of Trent and the utterances of more recent popes. Reference is made to the Address of Pius XII to the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives in which direct sterilization is defined as “that which aims at making procreation impossible as both means and end.”(9) The concept of “direct” is thus described in terms of the physical structure and causality of the act itself.

The moral conclusion of the Encyclical forbidding any interference with the conjugal act is based on the “intimate structure of the conjugal act” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 12). The “design of God” is written into the very nature of the conjugal act; man is merely “the minister of the design established by the Creator” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 13). The Encyclical acknowledges that “it is licit to take into account the natural rhythms immanent in the generative functions.” Recourse to the infecund periods is licit, whereas artificial contraception “as the use of means directly contrary to fecundation is condemned as being always illicit” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 16). “In reality there are essential differences between the two cases; in the former, the married couple make legitimate use of a natural disposition; in the latter, they impede the development of natural processes” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 16). The natural law theory employed in the Encyclical thus identifies the moral and human action with the physical structure of the conjugal act itself.

Classicist World View. The Encyclical appears to operate within the horizon of a classicist world view and does not take into consideration the more historically minded world view which is now perfectly acceptable, indeed more acceptable, to contemporary Catholic theologians.

In its methodology, Humanae Vitae well illustrates a classicist approach. The Encyclical admits that “changes which have taken place are in fact noteworthy and of varied kinds” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 2). These changes give rise to new questions. However, the changing historical circumstances have not affected the answer or the method employed in arriving at concrete conclusions on implementing responsible parenthood. The primary reason for Humanae Vitae’s rejection of the majority report of the Papal Commission was “because certain criteria of solutions had emerged which departed from the moral teaching on marriage proposed with constant firmness by the teaching authority of the Church” (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 6).

Rationale Excessively Deductive. Since the Encyclical adopts a classicist world view and methodology, the natural law methodology employed in the Encyclical is excessively deductive and does not leave enough room for the inductive.

The Encyclical specifically acknowledges the fact that there are new signs of the times, but it is questionable whether sufficient attention has really been paid to such changes. The footnotes to the Encyclical are significant even if the footnote references alone do not constitute conclusive argument. The footnotes include only random scriptural texts (none of which pertain to the specific teaching of the Encyclical), one citation of Thomas Aquinas, and references to earlier pronouncements of the hierarchical magisterium. A more inductive approach would be inclined to give more importance and documentation to the signs of the times. The footnote references contain no indication of any type of dialogue with other Christians, non-Christians and the modern sciences. The Encyclical describes certain social consequences of the use of contraception (Humanae Vitae, paragraph 17), but no documentation is given for what appear to be unproven assumptions. Since the methodology describes the human act in physical terms, the practical moral conclusion is the absolute condemnation of means of artificial birth control. The Encyclical thus betrays an epistemology that has been rejected by many Catholic theologians and philosophers today. In addition, the document does not explicitly take into consideration what the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World regarded as a fact based on induction: “But where the intimacy of married life is broken off, it is not rare for the faithfulness to be imperilled and its quality of fruitfulness ruined” (Gaudium et Spes, paragraph 51).

Outdated Biological Conceptions. The assumptions of the Encyclical seem to be based on an outdated biology. Biology in general, and the understanding of the physiology of human reproduction in particular, have changed greatly in the last century. It is quite possible that much of the earlier reasoning against contraception was based on what is now known to be inadequate. Only within the current century, and particularly in the last few decades, has man come to a better understanding of the process of conception. Conception cannot occur unless the sperm is able to fertilize an ovum. However, a fertilizable ovum is present in the female only during a comparatively short time of the menstrual cycle. From a biological viewpoint, many acts of sexual intercourse are not truly open to procreation since there is no ovum present. Perhaps, as one author suggests, the natural law in this matter would call for a randomness of sexual acts, a principle which would be specifically violated by rhythm (.10)

Single Act Analysis. The Statement maintains that “many positive values concerning marriage are expressed in Paul VI’s encyclical.” Among the positive values is the insistence on the unitive and the procreative aspects of marriage and human sexuality, so that marriage is seen in terms of a union of love in the service of life. The Encyclical, however, views these two characteristics as being inseparably connected with each and every conjugal act (paragraphs 12 and 13). Modern biology, however, tells us that every act of sexual intercourse is not open to procreation. Should not the insistence be on the fact that sexual intercourse does have a relation to procreation, at least to the extent that it takes place within a procreative union? The danger exists today of many people forgetting the two inseparable meanings of marriage and sexuality, but one must also avoid the overreaction of stating that these two meanings are inseparably connected in each and every conjugal act.

Insufficient Attention to Demographic Questions. The Encyclical does not seem to give sufficient attention and weight to one of the most talked-about signs of the times—the question of overpopulation. The demographic problem is mentioned particularly in paragraphs 2 and 23. However, the Encyclical does not seem to accord this matter the same urgency as other Catholic scholars have attributed to it. No explicit mention is made of the fact that there are, even in the teaching of the Encyclicals, acceptable means of responsible parenthood to be utilized in an effort to come to grips with the demographic problem. Experts seem to agree that “economic and social progress” is in itself not enough to overcome the demographic problem as it is existing in some countries. The Encyclical could have disputed such assertions, or at least recognized them and offered more positive approaches towards their solution. Thus the Encyclical is open to the charge of failing to give sufficient attention to this very perplexing problem.(11)

Other Acceptable Approaches

Different approaches to natural law and ethical theories currently employed in Catholic theology today would come to different conclusions on the matter of contraception. Three such perspectives could be described as: a more personalist approach; a more relational approach; and a transcendental method.

A More Personalist Approach. A more personalist approach has characterized much of contemporary ethics. For the Christian, the biblical revelation contributes to such an understanding of reality. A personalist approach cannot be something merely added on to another theory. A personalist perspective will definitely affect moral conclusions, especially when such conclusions have been based on the physical structure of the act itself. Personalism always sees the act in terms of the person positing the act and does not determine morality merely by an examination of the structure and finality of a given organ or faculty viewed apart from the person. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World realized that objective standards in the matter of sexual morality are “based on the nature of the human person and his acts.” (See paragraph 51.) Bernard Haering has shown how such a personalist approach would deny an absolute condemnation of artificial contraception. (12)

A More Relational Approach. A more relational understanding of morality stems from a different view of man. The natural law approach as found in the manuals of theology views nature as a principle of operation within every existing thing. Thus, man should act according to the design of God inscribed in his very nature, which is unfolded in his life and actions. Notice that the Encyclical adopts such a view of man. However, many thinkers today view man not as a substantial entity existing in himself, with his own nature as the complete guiding principle of his life embedded within him, but rather as a person existing as a being with others in a network of relationships. Man is not a being totally programmed by the nature he has. Rather, man is characterized by openness, freedom and the challenge to make himself and his world more human in and through his many relationships. The human person is actually constituted in and through these relationships. Relationality thus characterizes man and his existence. Phenomenological and existentialist approaches view man as a being for and with others who is described in terms of intersubjectivity. A philosophy of process proceeds somewhat further in the direction of a more relational and historical approach to reality.

On the particular question of contraception, a more relational approach would not view the person or a particular faculty as something existing in itself. Each faculty exists in relationship with the total person and other persons within a universal community. Morality cannot merely be determined by examining a particular faculty and its physical structure or a particular act in itself. The changed ethical evaluation of lying well illustrates the point. Manuals of moral theology have generally accepted the Augustinian definition of lying as speech against what is in the mind (locutio contra mentem). The malice of lying thus consists in violatmg the purpose of the faculty of speech. Recently, Catholic theologians have proposed a different understanding of lying which actually corresponds more with the thinking of the earlier Augustine before he arrived at his famous definition. In this recent formulation, the malice of lying consists in the violation of the neighbour’s right to truth. Falsehood is the physical act of speech which is contrary to what is in the mind; but lying as an immoral act consists in the violation of my relationships with my neighbour and the community. Both Johann and van der Marck have employed a more relational approach to argue on behalf of the ethical value of, and need for, contraception in certain circum-stances.(13)

A Transcendental Method. A third philosophical approach to man espoused by a growing number of Catholic thinkers today is a theory of transcendental method. Transcendental methodology owes much to the neo-Thomist, Joseph Marechal, and is espoused today in varying forms by Bernard Lonergan, Karl Rahner and Emerich Coreth.

In general, transcendental method seeks to go beyond the object known to the structures of the human knowing process itself. According to Lonergan, the intrinsic objectivity of human cognitional activity is its intentionality.(14) Lonergan’s ethics is an extension of his theory of knowing. Moral value is not an intrinsic property of external acts or objects; it is an aspect of certain consciously free acts in relation to man’s knowledge of the world. Man must come to examine the structures of his knowing and deciding process. Lonergan uses as a tool the notion of horizon analysis. Basic horizon is the maximum field of vision from a determined standpoint. This basic horizon is open to development and even conversion. Lonergan posits four conversions which should transpire from the understanding of the structures of human knowing and deciding: the intellectual, the moral, the religious and the Christian. Ethics must bring people to this Christian conversion so that they can become aware of their knowing and doing and flee from inauthenticity, unreasonableness and the “surd” (absurdity) of sin. Thus, Christian ethics is primarily concerned with the manner in which an authentic Christian person makes his ethical decisions and carries them out. However, such a meta-ethics must then enter into the realm of the normative, all the time realizing the provisional value of its precepts which are limited by the data at hand. Donald Johnson has said of Lonergan’s ethic, as applied to moral theology: “The distinct contribution of the moral theologian to philosophical ethics would consist in clarifying the attitudes which are involved in man’s responding in faith to the initiative of a loving God who has redeemed man in Christ.” Thus a transcendental method would put greater stress on the knowing and deciding structures of the authentic Christian subject. Such a theory would also tend to reject the Encyclical’s view of man and his generative faculties.(15)

Conclusions Regarding Humanae Vitae and Natural Law. The notion of natural law has been under reconsideration in recent Roman Catholic theological research. The concept of natural law as employed in the Encyclical Humanae Vitae seems to be inadequate from a number of viewpoints. Other ethical theories or varieties of natural law thinking which have been proposed by Catholic theologians in the last decade would come to different conclusions about the absolute immorality of contraception.  Thus the natural law basis of the argument presented in the Encyclical is not convincing, and many Roman Catholic scholars have admitted as much, both before and after the issuance of the Encyclical.

The Morality of Contraception

Historical Development of the Argument against the Morality of Contraception (16)

Hebrew Scriptures. The Genesis accounts of creation (chaps. I and 2) evidence both the unitive and procreative aspects of the man-woman relationship as the ancient Hebrew writers viewed the ideal in the mind of Yahweh-God: “two in one flesh” and “increase and multiply” set a basic, double theme which recurs with varying emphasis and intermittent distortions throughout the entire course of salvation history. Immediately, within Genesis itself, the predominant value in human sexuality became procreation, especially for the feminine sex.

In a patriarchal society, woman encountered religious and social disabilities and was regarded as subordinate to man. Polygamy and slave concubinage were permitted. An unmarried man who had intercourse with an unmarried girl was to be fined and forced to take her as a wife, but if a girl had secretly been unchaste, she was to be stoned (Dt. 22:13-29). Divorce could be obtained only by a husband (Dt. 24:1-4).

“Woman as temptress” was a consistent theme. Woman embodied an attraction which might cause disaster. Eve and Dalia were temptresses to sin (Gn. 3:1-17, Jgs. 16). Bathsheba was the occasion of David’s fall; Tamar, of Amnon’s (2 Sam. 11-12, 2 Sam. 13). In the Psalms, sexuality was occasionally associated with sin. Ritual purification was necessary for man after emission of seed and for woman after menstruation and childbirth (Lv. 5:16, 18, 16:28, 12:1-8).

“Immortality through generation” was also consistently stressed. The salvation of the Jews, whether individually or collectively considered, was to come through generation. Their historical destiny could be achieved only if their race continued to flourish. This emphasis on procreation and the contempt for sexuality characterized the pre-Christian biblical view of sex.

There were explicit post-Exilic legislations against homosexuality, bestiality and temple prostitution (Lv. 8:22, 20:13, 20: 15-16, Dt. 23:18), but no law against contraception. In the absence of clear prohibition, the Jewish people would have believed that coitus interruptus or the use of contraceptives was not immoral. However, Onan was condemned for coitus interruptus with his sister-in-law. Some theologians attributed his condemnation to his contraceptive intention; Pope Pius XI, in his Casti Connubii, paragraph 55, cited this interpretation: “As St. Augustine notes: ‘Intercourse even with one’s legitimate wife is unlawful and wicked where his conception of the offspring is prevented. Onan, the son of Juda, did this and the Lord killed him for it.'” However, modern exegetes reject this interpretation. The reason for Onan’s condemnation could have been his disobedience to his father, violation of Jewish law or lack of family feeling.”

Christian Scripture. The teaching of Christ placed special emphasis on human behavior on love. However, the New Testament writers carried over many of the Old Testament notions of woman and human sexuality into Christianity. Likewise, the New Testament writers tended to accept uncritically some of the cultural assumptions of their own times, e.g., the inferiority of women. The understanding of sexuality in the writings of the New Testament can be summarized in the following themes: the value of virginity; the institutional goodness of marriage; the sacral character of sexual intercourse; the value of procreation; the significance of desire as well as act; the evil of extramarital intercourse; the un- naturalness of homosexuality; the connection of Adam’s sin with the rebelliousness of the body; and the evil of “medicine.”

The Gospels inculcate virginity as a great value when under-taken in view of the Kingdom of God. Procreation in marriage is emphasized less in the Gospels than it is in the Old Testament. There is no passage in the Gospels dealing explicitly with contraception. St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (1:24-27), which speaks of “unnatural acts,” could be interpreted as referring to one form of contraceptive conduct. Most exegetes conclude, however, that St. Paul was condemning homosexual and lesbian acts, not contraceptive acts. In his Epistle to the Galatians, St. Paul condemns pharmakeia (potion, medicine), and Apocalypse (9:21, 21:8) describe the punishments of pharmakoi (medicine men). However, it is not clear at all whether contraceptive drugs were condemned.

Conclusion from Scripture. There is no conclusive evidence in the Hebrew or Christian Scriptures that contraception is morally wrong. Note that the Encyclical Humanae Vitae offers no scriptural basis for its conclusions.

Early Fathers. The Church Fathers’ attitude toward human sexuality is characterized by a low estimate of the nature of woman. From St. Paul’s admonition “it is good for a man not to touch woman,” they reasoned that it must be bad to touch a woman. Methodius thought woman must be by nature “carnal and sensuous,” the “irrational half of mankind.” St. Jerome called woman “the devil’s gateway … a scorpion’s dart . . . .” St. Clement of Alexandria told woman that “it is shameful for her to think about what nature she has.” Tertullian told woman to make herself ugly, since her beauty “is dangerous to those who look upon it.” St. John Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Ambrose and Pope St. Gregory all considered woman to be naive, unstable, mentally weak and in need of an authoritative husband.

The most influential of the Church Fathers in regard to marriage and contraception is St. Augustine. His threefold good of marriage, proles, fides and sacramentum, had been accepted by theologians until recent times. His writings on contraception unfortunately reflected a violent reaction against the Manichees’ belief that all procreation was evil (since in conception the particles of light of the Father were imprisoned). St. Augustine maintained the opposite extreme: every intercourse must be pro-creative either in fact or in intent. One exception could be allowed when the conjugal debt was involved, but even in this respect positive interference (which would have included the “rhythm” method in his frame of reference) for contraceptive purposes was equally forbidden.

Injunctions against contraception are also found in the writings of Caesarius, Bishop of Aries (470-543), St. Martin of Braga (d. 579) and Gregory the Great, all former monks. Caesarius’ condemnation is based primarily on his conception of the particular medicinal potion (drink) as magical; its use was forbidden either for sterility or fertility. He considered use of a contraceptive potion to be a crime of homicide. St. Martin’s condemnation of contraception in the First Council of Barga was a reaction against the Priscillian movement, a form of Manicheanism. This document, universally accepted in the Spanish provinces, was later transmitted to the Western churches as the basis for future teachings and legislation.

St. Gregory the Great became Pope at the time of the moral decline of Roman civilization. To re-establish Christian morality in matters of sex, he adopted some of the extreme attitudes of the Stoics. He condemned not only contraception but also the pleasures of procreative coitus. He considered taking pleasure in legitimate intercourse to be sinful, and denied Communion to those who had not purified themselves after marital intercourse. Enhanced by Gregory’s personal prestige and the increasing authority of the papacy in the Middle Ages, this doctrine assured the absolute condemnation of contraceptive practice by the entire ecclesiastical institution.

Penitentials. From the sixth to the eleventh century, the teach¬ing on sexual morality in the Church is found especially in the Penitentials, books which assigned appropriate penances for par¬ticular sins. The rigidity of the Penitentials on sexual morality could hardly be exaggerated. Examples of the rigors of some Penitentials include: sterile couples were forbidden to have inter¬course; intercourse during menstruation was to be punished by twenty to forty days of penance; dorsal intercourse was to be punished by forty days of penance. Contraception is condemned in the Penitentials, at least in the eighth century and, perhaps, even in the sixth century.

Canonists. Beginning in the eleventh century, the canonists (principally Ivo, Bishop of Chartres (1091-1116), Gratian, the Camaldolese monk, and Peter the Lombard, the Bishop of Paris) systematized the teachings of earlier authors on human sexuality, including condemnations of contraception, with singular attention to the doctrine of St. Augustine. These canonical collections, in the opinion of some interpreters, were compiled in response to the spread of Catharism, a new form of Manicheanism which opposed procreation in marriage. However, in the midst of this movement against neo-Manicheanism, “dissenting” theologians, such as Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor, asserted that marriage served values other than procreation, such as love, spiritual union and avoidance of fornication. Their teachings on this topic failed to win wide audiences among their contemporaries.

Scholastics. St. Albert the Great and his disciple, St. Thomas Aquinas, rejected the view that contraception was a sin of homicide, but both considered contraception unnatural. They considered any sexual act in which procreative insemination was impossible to be a “sin against nature,” e.g., masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, coitus interruptus (withdrawal) and contraceptive acts in marriage. Moreover, they were of the opinion that “nature” also specified the proper position for intercourse. “The fit way,” so-called, “was with woman beneath the man”; they considered any deviation from this position unnatural and seriously sinful.

Aquinas distinguished the order of human reason from the order of nature, which is considered sacred and unchangeable: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself; wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the ordainer of nature.(18) Natural coitus as instituted by God should not be altered by man. A sin against nature is an affront to God, although “no other person is injured” (as distinguished from adultery or rape, which are against the order of reason in so far as another person is injured).

The Thomistic analysis considers the biological function of the sexual act as given by God and unalterable by man, and postulates that offspring are the natural end of copulation. Therefore, copulation for pleasure alone, or without procreative intention, is against nature. Similarly, Aquinas holds that an intention to have intercourse for the sake of health is against nature.(19) Coitus is naturally ordained for procreation and nothing else.

However, Aquinas teaches in his Summa Against the Gentiles that “if per accidens generation cannot follow from emission of the seed, this is not against nature, nor a sin, as if it happens that the woman is sterile.”(20) Thus, insemination appears to him the essential act required by nature. When insemination is made impossible, it is against nature, with or without the possibility of procreation. However, in an earlier work Aquinas condemned the potions of sterility as against nature, even though insemination would not be prevented by their use.(21) He never repeated this latter analysis, nor did he ever subsequently suggest that the use of contraceptive potions was a sin against nature.

Thomas posed three types of seminal ejaculation: (i) acts in which insemination was impossible (these were unnatural); (2) acts in which insemination was possible and conception resulted (these were natural and normal); and (3) acts in which insemination was possible, but conception did not occur (these were normal, but accidentally different from the norm). Aquinas does not demonstrate (2) as the norm and (3) as accidentally different; rather, he presupposes it. This presupposition was accepted by all theologians of his time, and Aquinas was never called to demonstrate it. Aquinas did not ask whether it makes sense to postulate one type of coitus as normal and to treat every variation from it as accidental, even cases in which it was known that conception was impossible, or to hold that old age was an “accidental” exception to the ability to generate.

Early Dissent from the Thomistic Analysis. No doubt Aquinas was influenced by the Augustinian view on sexuality; he in turn influenced later theologians and the Church in the teaching against contraception. But there was also an undercurrent of dissenting opinions, including that of Duns Scotus. From 1450 to 1750, certain radical departures from tradition had taken place. Martin Le Maistre (1432-1481) held that rendering the marital debt, avoiding fornication, seeking bodily health and calming the mind were proper purposes for marital intercourse. Denis the Carthusian (1402-1471) considered love a legitimate object of coitus. The Augustinian view declined in Church circles as other values, such as education of children, love and the welfare of married partners, were considered in regard to marital intercourse. However, the prohibition against contraception was maintained.

Factors in the Emerging Controversy. Faced with a crisis of over¬population, theologians began to consider what means of regulating birth are permissible, and what are not. Among the means discussed are: amplexus reservatus (uncompleted copulation), copula dimidita (partial penetration), certain sterilizing operations, “the pill” and other methods of contraception.

The contemporary controversy on birth control has taken place in a context marked by many new factors:

Population. The reduction of infant mortality and the prolongation of life have created the possibility of dangerous increases in population.

Status of Woman. With education and equal opportunity in modern society, woman is no longer considered a machine of procreation, but rather a person.

Education. Education today is not considered a luxury, but a necessity (including higher education). This fact adds new burdens to family finance.

Scientific Knowledge and Philosophy. Biological, psychological and sociological sciences provide new data which must be considered in the moral evaluation of human sexual behavior. Contemporary philosophy has also developed many different perspectives. The traditional notion of nature as static has been replaced with a more dynamic, more historical notion. In this integrated, dynamic and historical conception of the human person, the traditional and static analysis of human acts is no longer applicable. Contemporary theologians are developing a contextual, historical norm of human behavior.

Hierarchical Magisterium and Theologians:

Contemporary State of the Questions of Contraception

Magisterial Pronouncements on Responsible Parenthood before Humanae Vitae. The need for regulating births and the moral permissibility of so doing have gradually been recognized in magisterial pronouncements of the Church. Pope Pius XII taught that serious motives—which are very numerous and broad—can exempt the married couple from the duty of procreation for a long time, even for the entire duration of their marriage.(22) Pope John XXIII referred to this as a responsibility under certain circumstances. (23)  The Second Vatican Council spoke of fulfilling the task of parenthood “with human and Christian responsibility.” (24)  “The parents themselves should ultimately make this judgment in the sight of God.” (25)

No word of doubt is expressed in the Church today concerning this basic moral duty (responsible parenthood), but the teachings of the popes continued to reiterate the absolute condemnation of artificial contraception taught by Pius XI in Casti Connubii. There was, however, even before Humanae Vitae, a division of opinion in the Catholic Church as to the binding force of this norm on contraception.

Magisterium, Theologians and Contraception: Pre-1963 Statements. The principal pre-1963 statements condemning contraception were those of Pius XI (Casti Connubii, 1930) and Pius XII (Address to the Midwives, 1951).

Relevant portions of the Encyclical Casti Connubii, which was dated December 31, 1930, include:

But no reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become comformable to nature and morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious, (paragraph 51.)

Since, therefore, openly departing from the uninterrupted Christian tradition, some recently have judged it possible solemnly to declare another doctrine regarding this question, the Catholic Church, to whom God has entrusted the teaching and defence of the integrity and purity of morals, standing erect in the midst of the moral ruin which surrounds her, in order that she may preserve the chastity of the nuptial union from being defiled by this foul stain, raises her voice in token of her divine ambassadorship and through Our mouth proclaims anew: any use whatsoever of matrimony exercized in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offense against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin. (paragraph 56.)

Most theological evaluation of Pius XII’s statement on the subject would refer to Casti Connubii as the magisterial source of Pius XII’s pronouncements. Thus, critiques of Casti Connubii would by implication involve the Address to the Midwives. A few authors said Pius XI’s condemnation in Casti Connubii was an ex cathedra definition (hence infallible); others said the teaching was infallible from the ordinary and universal magisterium; others said it was “certain” from tradition, etc.; others (the clear majority) said it was noninfallible. Influential on the American scene was John C. Ford, S.J., who argued that the “common denominator” of all the commentators on Casti Connubii was that the condemnation of contraception was at least definable doctrine: while prescinding from infallibility, this approach safeguards the teaching’s irrevocability.(26) This attempt to create a category of “irrevocable” halfway between infallibility and noninfallibility (an evaluation which Ford is apparently repeating since Humanae Vitae) is highly tendentious.

The ecclesiology of the moralists in this period was strongly post-Vatican I (an infallibility-minded era); there was no open dispute (not even open discussion!) on the morality of contraception. The norm was simply accepted and not tested or contested by Catholic theologians.

Period from 1963 to Humanae Vitae. Commencing in 1963, a number of prelates, an ever-increasing number of theologians and a large segment of the faithful, in view of scientific, historical, sociological, psychological, demographic and theological considerations, began questioning the Church’s ban of “the pill” and other forms of contraception when used for purposes of responsible birth control. The question asked was whether every contraceptive intervention—not simply that done from egoistic and hedonistic motives but even that done for very weighty and responsible reasons—is morally evil in itself. Profound scriptural, traditional and theological reasons were given for revision of the norm. The public discussion brought out for the first time a grave difference of opinion, bringing a measure of uncertainty to all those Catholics—laity, priests and bishops—who were earnestly seeking the truth. It is clear that during this period the Church was experiencing a widespread and seriously-based atmosphere of perplexity and uncertainty concerning the licit means for implementing the duty of responsible parenthood.

Any analysis of the certitude and binding force of the magisterial teaching, and of the ways in which magisterial pronouncements may or may not allow of a variety of theological interpretations within the Church, must at least take into account what those theological interpretations were between 1963 and 1968. It will become evident that, among reputable Catholic theologians, a great variety of moral theories were being proposed during this time which found their way into pastoral practice on the part of bishops, priests and laity.(27)

1) Defense of Absolute, Intrinsic Immorality of Contraception.

Some theologians, even in the years of new debate on this topic, were defending on philosophical and theological grounds the teachings of Pius XI and Pius XII that contraception (understood as positive methods of directly preventing conjugal intercourse from resulting in conception) is intrinsically and gravely immoral. Though admitting in many instances that these arguments are rarely convincing to all, particularly to those who do not share the Roman Catholic faith, they advance clarification of the papal teachings and philosophical considerations of their own to support this teaching, arguing from either the procreational purpose of the conjugal act, or from its purpose of mutual self-donation or both.(28)

One of the most thoroughly elaborated defences of this position is that proposed by Germain Grisez. (29) He contends that the arguments customarily advanced to support the authoritative teachings of recent pontiffs—the “perverted faculty” argument and the argument from loving self-donation-—are based on an inadequate theory of natural law. More recently, many philosophers and theologians have pointed to a number of grave weaknesses in Grisez’s natural law argument. However, Grisez’s approach at least illustrates the fact that natural law does not indicate a monolithic philosophical system.

The minority report of the pope’s commission on the problem of the family, population and natality maintained this same view that contraception is always (i.e., intrinsically) seriously evil. It admitted, however, that clear and cogent arguments based on reason alone could not be given. Instead, it based its position largely on the fact that the magisterium has consistently upheld this position in the past. (30)

With an increasing awareness of the almost insufferable hardships entailed in a truly responsible parenthood, and cognizant of newer insights into the psychology of moral imputability, a number of authors were prepared to admit that, although the use of contraceptives is objectively gravely immoral, subjectively its use may rather frequently be only venially sinful, or perhaps not sinful at all. Thus they were willing to admit a more lenient pastoral approach, while still maintaining that contraception is objectively wrong.

2) Possibility of Change in the Teaching of the Hierarchical Magisterium.

The aforementioned authors were operating on the stated assumption that the magisterial statements of the popes condemning contraception were irreversible and admitted of no change. A considerable number of theologians, however, addressing themselves more recently to the question of contraception and the development of doctrine within the Church, and taking into account new knowledge which is available, concluded that the formulation of the norm as expressed by Pius XI in Casti Connubii admitted of development to a formulation which would morally permit the use of contraceptives, at least in some cases, without thereby betraying the core or basic value conveyed by the Church’s traditional teachings on marriage. This position was proposed by Gregory Baum and others.  (31)

The possibility, and perhaps desirability, of a change in the norm was also promoted both in the public mind as well as in theological reflection by the interventions of several cardinals during the Second Vatican Council in the Fall of 1964. Cardinal Leger said that fundamental principles must be reinvestigated—not simply to meet a popular demand, but rather because of a keener theological analysis of marriage and from new discoveries in biology, psychology and sociology. He said that fecundity should be described as affecting the whole state of matrimony rather than every single act. Cardinal Alfrink pointed to real doubts, in the case of a serious marital dilemma, as to whether complete or periodical continence is the only efficacious, moral and Christian solution. Patriarch Maximos IV Saigh asked whether the official positions of the Church should not be revised in the light of modern science, both theological and medical, psychological and sociological.

3) Distinction among Various Forms of Contraception—Approval of “The Pill.”

Theologians generally do not hold that the magisterial pronouncements, especially Casti Connubii, condemning contraception apply to contraceptive sterilization with the same authoritative and juridical force.(32) However, Pius XII explicitly condemned direct (contraceptive) sterilization in an authentic, noninfal- lible way, and applied this teaching to the progestational steroid (the so-called “birth control pill”), condemning as immoral its use for the direct purpose of suppressing ovulation for the sake of avoiding conception. (33)

The first public questioning of the traditional teaching argued in favour of the use of “the pill,” but these early probings still condemned other forms of contraception. Certain theologians—Louis Janssens, W. van der Marck and Josef M. Reuss—said that the natural process of the individual sex act should be respected, but procreation may licitly be excluded as an effect of the sex act through the anti-ovulation pills when serious reasons justify this method of responsible parenthood. (34) This opinion came to be held very widely. Ambrogio Valsecchi, who summarized virtually all the writings of the theologians during this period on every moral aspect of “the pill,” established that the majority of European theologians, writing on this topic after the above-mentioned three articles, saw this view as possible, or were outright favour-able towards it.(35) He found the theological situation in America the reverse: there was opposition to the new moral opinion, but not by many theologians; and those Americans who continued to oppose it failed to offer new development of thought in reference to the newer problems which had been raised.

4) Each Individual Act Need Not Be Open to Procreation: Acceptance of All Forms of Contraception as Such.

The new opinions just referred to were followed by a more basic examination into the moral question of contraception itself. After studying the implications of biology (and the merits of employing a biologically determined moral norm), anthropology (which sees marriage as a whole, having one complex aim), psychology (and the importance of a sustained and harmonious love for marriage), sociology (newer elements in the social structure of the family, overpopulation) and other newer dimensions of sex in marriage, many theologians (eventually the majority) could see no moral difference between the use of “the pill” and other methods of conscientious birth regulation. In many cases, the arguments already offered by some theologians to justify the contraceptive use of “the pill” were also found applicable to other contraceptive methods generally. Thus the opinion began to be proposed by many theologians that the meaning of marriage always includes the notion of procreation, but that every individual human sexual act in marriage need not be open to procreation. (36)

The climax of this trend was the majority theological opinion of the so-called papal birth control commission. Without making any important distinctions among the various methods, the majority view holds that the use of contraception should not always be considered intrinsically and gravely immoral. It should be noted that the use of contraception is not thought to be good in every case, nor preferable, as though its unreasonable use could not lead to selfish hedonism. Instead, these theologians concluded that, in the face of serious reasons for limiting family size, and considering the duty of maintaining family harmony and fidelity through the more or less regular use of full sexual intimacies in marriage, it cannot be held that every sexual act must remain “open to procreation.” (37)

5) Ideal/Real Situation; “Lesser of Two Evils”: A Pastoral Approach.

A final unique category of theological opinion on the morality of contraception teaches that the marital act is both unifying and creative of fruitful love, and that neither purpose should be effectively excluded from the act. But this opinion holds that the Catholic teaching is a positive vocation to an ideal. The ideal would be to attain the full beauty and truth of sexual consummation by realizing all the levels of its meaning in the act. This cannot be attained all at once: it calls for a morality of growth. This viewpoint suggests that it is difficult to arrive at the prohibition of any particular act, that there is usually a combination of values and disvalues in human acts in man’s fallen state, and the overriding value is to achieve as many “goods” as possible toward implementing the moral order.(38) This perspective certainly mitigates the “objectively and intrinsically immoral” designation of every contraceptive act. It maintains that, when the marital embrace involves both values and disvalues, the moral decision should not be based on whatever may be defective in the specific shape the act takes here and now but on the best that can be done. Such a decision must not be considered sinful: in view of the total end aimed at, it may be a proof of wisdom. To know how to accept imperfect behavior as, at the moment, the “least bad” choice is to behave wisely and virtuously. This moral analysis differs only little from the opinion which held that contraception may be chosen, when necessary, as “the lesser of two evils.” (39)

Responses of the Magisterium to the Mid-60’s Controversy. With respect to this mounting controversy, the highest ecclesiastical authorities (Ecumenical Council and Pope) were not able to remove doubts by stating a definitive or unchangeable norm.

1) Vatican II (1965). The Council manifested an awareness of a crisis of responsible Christian parenthood in the lives of many married people. The Constitution on the Church in the Modern World honestly acknowledged and described this dilemma: that sometimes couples should not procreate; yet they should not forego all sexual intimacy, for otherwise family harmony would be threatened—an unfortunate outcome which would militate against the basic educational purpose of marriage.

This Council realizes that certain modern conditions often keep couples from arranging their married lives harmoniously, and that they find themselves in circumstances where at least temporarily the size of their families should not be increased. As a result, the faithful exercise of love and the full intimacy of their lives is hard to maintain. But where the intimacy of married life is broken off, its faithfulness can sometimes be imperiled and its quality of fruitfulness ruined, for then the upbringing of the children and the courage to accept new ones are both endangered.(40)

The uncertainty concerning whether every prevention of conception is morally evil in itself, or whether contraceptive measures cannot be justified for serious objective reasons, was heightened by the decision of the Council not to decide this question.(41) The Council affirmed that there are “illicit practices against human generation,” and admonished Catholics that, in practice, it is not permissible for them to “undertake methods of regulating procreation which are found blameworthy by the teaching authority of the Church in its unfolding of the divine law.” An explanatory foot-note in the conciliar document, after referring to previous papal norms, added:

Certain questions which need further and more careful investigations have been handed over, at the command of the Supreme Pontiff, to a commission for the study of population, family, and births, in order that, after it fulfills its function, the Supreme Pontiff may pass judgment. Since the doctrine of the magisterium is such, this holy Synod does not intend to propose immediately concrete solutions. (42)

It has been claimed that the Council’s handling of this matter condemned contraception, excluding any practical doubt on the matter. (43)  If this were so, the teaching of Humanae Vitae on this topic would have been quite superfluous with respect to the judgment of the certitude of the teaching. Others have sharply denied that the Council reaffirmed as certain and unchangeable the unexceptionable moral malice of contraceptive interventions. (44) The Council, in its examination of the votes iuxta modum, rejected any modi which called for incorporation of suitable formulations of the traditional norm in the conciliar text. (45) Pope Paul himself said that the Second Vatican Council was not able to resolve the question: deeper study was needed. (46) Vatican II, therefore, without explicitly and substantially changing the traditional teaching that every contraceptive action is evil in itself, did not confirm with conciliar authority such earlier teaching. (47)

2) Paul VI—The Commission Period. Having appointed a special commission to study the morality of contraception, Pope Paul admitted that the question was “an extremely complex and delicate problem,” and that new knowledge was shedding light on the question. (48) He said the norms of Pius XII should be regarded as valid, but that such traditional authoritative teaching was not irreformable in the sense of a final definition; he declared himself prepared to announce a change if he felt bound in conscience. (49)  He requested expert advice so that he could give guidance without ambiguity. (50) He said that the consciences of men should not be left exposed to painful uncertainties; (51) that deeper study was needed because the Church’s teaching authority cannot establish moral standards unless it is certain it is interpreting God’s will; and that the Church was trying to reach such certitude. (52)

Pope Paul, who had reserved the birth control question to himself, (53) received the report of his birth control commission in 1966, but declared that no decisive pronouncement could be made until he studied further the doctrinal, pastoral and social implications of the change in the norm proposed by his commission. (54) The Pope stated, on the same occasion, that the Church’s norm prohibiting contraception “cannot be considered not binding as if the magisterium of the Church were in a state of doubt at the present time, whereas it is in a moment of study and reflection concerning matters which have been put before it as worthy of the most attentive consideration.” (55)

Theologians’ Positions on the Binding Force of the Magisterial Norm before Humanae Vitae. It has already been pointed out that the majority of theologians writing on the question of contraception at this time began to favor the use of the pill as a legitimate means for regulating birth. Likewise, a growing number of theologians, even the majority in the later years, as indicated in the majority report of the birth control commission, came to the conclusion that there was no decisive theological difference between the pill and other forms of contraception, such as rhythm, and argued for a change in the teaching of the Church on contraception. It is common knowledge that a substantial number of Catholic theologians asserted that in certain circumstances Catholic couples could in good conscience use contraception in the responsible planning of their families. These theologians saw no objective or subjective evil in the use of contraception in these circumstances.

How could Catholic theologians come to this conclusion in the light of the teaching of Casti Connubii, the later addresses of the popes, and especially the most recent statements of Paul VI? These theologians maintained there could be a development of teaching from the time of Pius XI and that the teaching of the magisterium on this issue could change. Various propositions were articulated by these theologians in support of their dissent.

1) Probable Opinion to the Contrary. The teaching of Casti Connubii was no longer binding, nor were the more recent but less authoritative statements made by subsequent popes, especially by Paul VI, binding. The weight of theological opinion was now so strong that there was a probable opinion that one could use contraception in certain circumstances. (56)

2) Norms as Disciplinary. The teaching of Casti Connubii was no longer true in the light of a development of the teaching, and the recent statements of Paul VI were more in the nature of disciplinary norms. In his statements, the Pope admitted that he had not yet given his final view. Thus one could treat the statements of Paul VI as practical rules, or as what theology has traditionally called merely disciplinary norms. Such norms would not be binding in the face of a proportionate, grave incommodum (serious inconvenience) in observing them. (57)

3) Conditional Assent to Noninfallible Teaching: Possibility of “Dissent.” The question of contraception naturally gave rise to the question of the magisterium in moral matters. There was dissatisfaction with some solutions which did not go to the heart of the problem. The question of whether or not Catholics could use contraception was intimately tied up with a proper understanding of the magisterium. In this light, it is interesting to read the following citation from Richard A. McCormick. (Note that McCormick has the reputation of a very modern theologian who, later than many others, saw the need for a change in the teaching on contraception.)

Theologians would contend that the precise obliging force of papal statements on contraception is their doctrinal force. That is, authoritative Church interventions on questions of natural law are educative in the moral order. This educative aspect is the basic source of their obligatory power. In other words, the Catholic recognizes in the magisterium a divine commission to teach, to enlighten consciences.

Because of this divine commission and the promise of aid in its execution, authentic non-infallible Church interpretations of natural law enjoy the presumption of correctness, and it is this presumption which founds the duty in prudence to accept in a human way these teachings; for we are all bound to prudence in the formation of our consciences. The obligation is not the result of a legal directive.

Once it is shown, therefore, that there are intrinsic reasons (good and probable) why the Church may change her teaching on contraception, it would seem that the foundation for a certain obligation has ceased to exist—precisely because the obligation never derived in the first place from a legal directive, but from a teaching or doctrinal statement. If the teaching statement becomes doubtful, does not the obligation also? And if the pertinence of past norms to divine law is doubtful, is not the teaching statement doubtful?

But, it has been claimed, the address of Pope Paul VI on October 29, 1966, repudiated the existence of a doubt. Verbally, yes. But a careful reading of this address (wherein the Pope said explicitly that he was not making his decisive statement on contraception) will lead one to the conclusion that it could not have been a doctrinal or teaching statement. Noonan admits this when he asserts that the Pope was actually admitting a “doubt as to the divine immutable character of the law.” Only an authentic teaching statement is capable of dissipating a genuine doctrinal doubt. And that is why I would agree with the many theologians who contend that the matter of contraception is, as of now, at least for situations of genuine conflict, just where it was before the papal address—in a state of practical doubt. (58)

Thus before Humanae Vitae theologians could and did responsibly teach that, on the question of contraception, there was sufficient reason to dissent from the authoritative, noninfallible, papal teaching on this point. On July 29, 1968, a Roman Catholic theologian familiar with the historical development of the question of contraception was generally aware of these two theological positions: the right and at times the obligation to dissent even in a public way from authoritative, non-infallible papal teaching, and the insuficiences of the natural law reasoning proposed in defence of the absolute condemnation of artificial contraception.

Conscience as a Framework of Dissent

The penultimate paragraph of the Statement by Theologians maintains: “Therefore, as Roman Catholic theologians, conscious of our duty and our limitations, we conclude that spouses may responsibly decide according to their conscience that artificial contraception in some circumstances is permissible and indeed necessary to preserve and foster the values and sacredness of marriage.”

The Statement by Theologians is not based on an unnuanced, universal moral principle that subjective conscience can be followed without moral wrong in each and every situation. In the total context, the Statement has indicated that in the matter of artificial contraception, there are sufficient reasons to reject the absolute ban on artificial contraception proposed in Humanae Vitae. Whether or not sufficient reasons are present in a particular case is a judgment that must ultimately be made by the conscience of the couple themselves as they try to weigh all the values involved in the situation. Such an approach to conscience is neither new nor startling for one familiar with Catholic theology; in fact, the same approach has been followed in the matter of responsible parenthood itself. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World recognizes that couples may “find themselves in circumstances where at least temporarily the size of their families should not be increased.” (59) The same Constitution affirms that “the decision concerning the number of children they will have depends on the correct judgment of the parents.” (60) Thus the Council document merely summarizes what all Catholic theologians would teach about responsible parenthood—parents do not have to bring into the world all the children they can possibly procreate but should responsibly plan their families in the light of all the values present, with the ultimate judgment in this case left to the honest decision of the couple themselves.

Scholastic Terminology. Conscience is generally described in manuals of Catholic moral theology as the judgment of the practical reason about the moral goodness of a practical act (.61)

Scholastic theologians have traditionally distinguished various types of conscience, although not all have agreed on the terminology employed. The problem of conscience in the context of moral theology arises from the tensions between the subjective pole of morality and the objective pole of morality, or between freedom and truth (although some contemporary theologians are striving to overcome the total dichotomies implied in such terminology).

Conscience is true (vera) if it corresponds to the objective order; erroneous (erronea) if it does not correspond to the objective order. A sincere conscience (conscientia recta) is one subjectively formed in the proper way but which may be erroneous. A true and sincere conscience must always be followed. Theologians generally admit that a sincere but invincibly erroneous conscience (sometimes called the erroneous conscience in good faith) must be followed by the individual. However, a vincibly erroneous conscience cannot be followed without moral guilt. To properly appraise statements made about the rights of conscience by people speaking in the context of the scholastic idiom, it is necessary to be familiar with the above distinctions.

Concerning the decision of conscience to use artificial contraception, three possibilities exist:

1)  Some theologians would hold that the decision to use contraception could come from a true and sincere conscience. The Statement by the theologians is consonant with this understanding.

2)  Some statements by Catholic bishops and theologians indicate that such decision could reflect a sincere but erroneous conscience; the error on the part of such a person would be invincible, and he would not be guilty in following such a conscience although there would remain a moral obligation to overcome the error and arrive at the truth.

3)  Others maintain that, after Humanae Vitae, such a conscience would be vincibly erroneous and, consequently, could not be followed without moral guilt.

Contemporary Catholic Moral Theology. Catholic moral theology avoids any simplistic, absolute norm based on the rights of the individual conscience. Such an unnuanced universal norm would destroy the efforts of moral theology and Christian ethics which endeavor to point out the good, fitting and right thing to do. One cannot appeal merely to such an unnuanced moral norm to justify his actions. Some confusion apparently arises from a poor understanding on the Declaration on Religious Liberty (Vatican II), but the declaration studiously avoids the technical term “freedom of conscience,” probably because of the many simplistic understandings of this term.

Catholic moral theology has attempted to present an ethical approach based on reality rather than on mere subjectivistic whims and fancies. Conscience ultimately must conform itself to the moral order. However, Catholic theology is recognizing more and more that such a moral order cannot be spelled out beforehand in very specific terms.

The just war theory proposed by Catholic theologians maintains that the individual must decide in each and every case whether the war is just. The same argument is being employed in support of civil law recognition of selective conscientious objection—a position adopted in the 1968 Pastoral Letter of the American Bishops. Catholic theology stresses that the conscience must be properly formed before making its decisions. However, this obligation does not require a scholar’s grasp of all the issues involved. If such were required, people could not realistically make decisions of conscience. A commensurate amount of diligence and inquiry is what is required. In addition, conscience itself does not properly operate only in a coldly rationalistic way. In fact, the rationalistic aspect of conscience has been overemphasized to the detriment of other aspects, such as intuition and connaturality.

A greater emphasis is being placed upon conscience in the contemporary milieu. More stress is placed on the dignity of the human person and the need for man to respond to the call of God in a personal manner from the very depths of his own person.(62) Such personal responsibility requires man to take a more active and creative role in bringing about the betterment of the world and society. Sociological changes have given more people an education and an opportunity to make creative contributions to society. The emphasis on historicity, growth and development has focused on the responsibility of man to direct such growth and change. The objective moral order is no longer conceived as a minute plan spelled out in unchanging patterns which will always be existing and normative for the Christian.

In moral theology today the question of conscience frequently arises in the context of the debate about “situation ethics” and absolute norms in moral theology. A responsible theologian must avoid the simplistic “either/or” approach to problems (e.g., either follow conscience or follow objective norms as taught in Catholic moral theology). Catholic moral theory has always tried to avoid subjectivism by holding that morality is based on reality. Today, newer epistemological theories are coming to grips with the problems of reality. Reality cannot be considered merely in terms of the objectivity of the object “out there.” These newer epistemological approaches strive for a critical realism, which ultimately tries to overcome some of the simplistic, subjective-objective dichotomy of the past.

The brief discussion of scholastic terminology and newer trends in the understanding of conscience illustrates the complexity of the problem and the need to avoid simplistic solutions. The conclusion of the Statement by Theologians is not based on a simplistic and universal principle that subjective conscience can be followed without wrong in every situation. The entire context of the Statement and the six chapters of this volume indicate the true interpretation of the conclusion: in this particular case of artificial contraception, there are sufficient reasons for dissenting from the absolute ban enunciated in Humanae Vitae, but in the individual case, the final judgment must be made by the consciences of the couples after carefully weighing all the values involved.

Notes

1. C. Ryan, O.P., “The Traditional Concept of Natural Law: An Investigation,” in Illtud Evans, ed., Light on the Natural Law (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965).
2. J. M. Aubert, “Le droit naturel: ses avatars historiques et son avenir,” Supplément de la Vie Spirituelle 81 (May, 1967), pp. 282-322.
3. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, paras. 74 and 79.
4. F. Boeckle, ed., Das Naturrecht im Disput (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1966).
5. B. Lonergan, Collection (New York: Herder, 1967), pp. 252-267; “A Transition From a Classicist Worldview to Historical Mindedness,” in J. E. Biechler, ed., Law For Liberty (Baltimore: Helicon, 1967).
6. K. Rahner, Spirit in the World (New York: Herder, 1968); B. Lonergan, Insight, A Study in Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957); Collection (New York: Herder, 1967); E. Coreth, Metaphysics (New York: Herder, 1968).
7. R. Johann, Building The Human (New York: Herder, 1968); F. Simons, “The Catholic Church and the New Morality,” Cross Currents, 16 (1966) , pp. 429-445; W. van der Marck, Toward a Christian Ethic (New York: Newman Press, 1967); F. Boeckle, ed., Das Naturrecht im Disput (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1966); B. Schueller, “Zur theologschen Diskussion ueber die lex naturalis,” Theologie und Philosophie, 41 (1966), 481-503.
8. In this section the subject professors again want to express their gratitude to Herder & Herder for the permission to publish in book form materials which in substantially the same form were published in Contraception: Authority and Dissent, C. E. Curran, ed. (New York: Herder, 1969), especially pp. 159-175.
9. 43 AAS (1951), P- 838.
10. T. L. Hayes, “The Biology of the Reproductive Act,” , 15 (1965), PP- 393-406.
11. S. Mudd, ed., The Population Crisis and The Use of World Resources (The Hague: Dr. W. Junk, 1964); M. Cepede, F. Houtart, L. Grond, Population and Food (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964).
12. B. Haering, “The Inseparability of the Unitive-Procreative Functions of the Marital Act,” in C. Curran, ed (New York: Herder, 1969).
13. R. O. Johann, “Responsible Parenthood: A Philosophical View,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 20 (1965). PP- 115-128; W. H. van der Marck, op. cit., pp. 48-60.
14. Lonergan, Collection (New York: Herder, 1967), pp. 121-267.
15. D. H. Johnson, “Lonergan and the Redoing of Ethics,” Continuum, 5 (1967) ,  pp. 211-220.
16. This section follows very closely the highly respected historical research found in J. T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); full citation and references cited herein are available in Professor Noonan’s book.
17. Noonan, op. cit., pp. 34-35.
18. II-II, 154, 12, ad obj. 1.
19. On the Sentences, 4.31, 2.2.
20. Summa Against the Gentiles, 3.122.
21. On the Sentences, 4.31.
22. Address to the Midwives, October 29, 1951, in AAS 43 (1951), pp. 835-54, at pp. 845-46; Address to the Family Front, November 26, 1951, in 43 AAS (1951), pp. 855-60, at p. 59.
23. Mater et Magistra, May 15, 1961, in 53 AAS (1961), pp. 401-64, at pp. 447-48.
24. Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, para. 50.
25. Ibid.
26. J. C. Ford and G. Kelly, Marriage Questions: Contemporary Moral Theology II (Westminster: Newman, 1963), pp. 256-78.
27. Among the better surveys of the theological literature on contraception at this time is: A. Valsecchi, “La discussione morale sui progestativi,” La Scuola Cattolica 93 (1965), supplemento 2, i57*-2i6*.
28. G. Kelly, “Contraception and Natural Law,” , 18 (1963), pp. 25-45, and reiterated in the book he coauthored with J. C. Ford (op. cit., supra). Their works appeared, however, before the traditional teaching was thoroughly challenged in Catholic theology.
29. G. Grisez, Contraception and the Natural Law (Milwaukee: Bruce,1964).
30. “Report of the Commission for the Study of Population, Family and Births,” The National Catholic Reporter (April 19, 1967), pp. 9-12.
31. G. Baum, “Can the Church Change Her Position on Birth Control?” in T. Roberts, ed., Contraception and Catholics (New York: Herder, 1964), pp. 311-344; Dewart, “Casti Connubii and the Development of Dogma,” ibid., pp. 202-310; F. H. Drinkwater, “Ordinary and Universal Magisterium,” The Clergy Review 50 (1965), pp. 2-22; E. Schillebeeckx, “De Naturwet in verband met de Katholieke huwelijksopvatting,” Jaarobek der Katholieke Theologen 1961 (Hilversun, 1963), pp. 5-51; and others.
32. G. Kelly, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
33. 43 AAS (1951), 843-44; 50 (1958), 734-35-
34. L. Janssens, “Morale conjugale et progestogenes,” Ephermerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 39 (1963), pp. 787-826; W. van der Marck, “Vruchtbaarheidsregeling,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie, 3 (1963), pp. 378-413; J. M. Reuss, “Eheliche Hingabe und Zeugung,” Tuebinger Theologische Quartalschrift, 143 (1963), pp. 454-476.
35. A. Valsecchi, op. cit.
36. Louis Dupre, Contraception and Catholics (Baltimore: Helicon, 1964), van der Marck, Liefde en vruchtbaarheid. Aktuele vragen over geboorteregcling (Roermond: Romen, 1964). (This work is also available in English translation: Love and Fertility. Contemporary Questions about Birth Regulation [London: Sheed & Ward, 1965]; E. Schillebeeckx, “De Naturwet in verband met de katholieke huwelijksopvatting,” Jaarboek der Katholieke Theologen 1961 (Hilversum, 1963), pp. 5-51.
37. “Report of the Commission for the Study of Population, Family and Births,” The National Catholic Reporter (April 19, 1967), pp. 8-12.
38. P. de Locht, La morale conjugate (Brussels: CNPF, 1964).
39. For a summary of the various approaches, see Concilium, Vol. 5 (1965), articles by F. Boeckle, “Birth Control, A Survey of German, French and Dutch Literature on the Question of Birth Control,” pp. 97-129; E. McDonagh, “Recent English Literature on the Moral Theology of Marriage,” pp. 130-154.
40. Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution on The Church in The Modern World, para. 51; Pope Paul VI speaking to the College of Cardinals on June 23, 1964, had already acknowledged the existence, the complexity and the delicacy of this problem: 56 AAS (1965), p. 588.
41. Bishop Reuss, Verantwortete Elternschaft (Mainz: Matthias-Gruenewald-Verlag, 1967), pp. 83-116.
42. Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution on The Church in The Modern World, paras. 47 and 51, Fn. 14.
43. J. C. Ford and J. J. Lynch, “Contraception: a Matter of Practical Doubt?” Homiletic and Pastoral Review, 68 (1968), pp. 563-574.
44. V. Heylen, “La Note 14 dans la constitution pastorale ‘Gaudium et Spes,'” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 42 (1966), fasc. 3.
45. Cf. Expensio modorum partis secundae, approved by the Council, paras. Ic, le, 42a, 56d, 71, 79, 93, 98a, I04f, 105a, 107I1.
46. Pope Paul VI, February 12, 1966, 58 AAS (1966), p. 219.
47. Reuss, op. cit., pp. 85-86, who also states, from the study of Heylen, that footnote 14 points to a doubt in the Church, “dubitante ecclesia.”
48. June 23, 1964, 56 AAS (1964), p. 588.
49. Ibid., pp. 588-589.
50. March 27, 1965, 57 AAS (1965), pp. 388-390.
51. Ibid.
52. February 12, 1966, AAS, 58 (1966), p. 219.
53. 56 AAS (1964), pp. 581-589; Pastoral Constitution on The Church in The Modern World, para. 51; 58 AAS (1966), pp. 1168-1170.
54. October 29, 1966, 58 AAS (1966), p. 1169.
55. Id., pp. 1169-1170.
56. E.g., R. A. McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology,” 26 Theological Studies, (1965), p. 646.
57. J. T. Noonan, “The Pope’s Conscience,” Commonweal 85 (1967), 559ff; R. A. McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology,” Theological Studies, 28 (1967), pp. 796-800; B. Haering, “Aber wir Beicht- vaeter . . . !” Theologie der Gegenwart 10 (1967), pp. 40-43; J. M. Reuss, Verantwortete Elternschaft (Mainz: Matthias-Gruene- wald-Verlag, 1967), pp. 83-116.
58. R. A. McCormick, “Notes on Moral Theology,” Theological Studies, 28 (1967), pp. 799-800.
59. Vatican II, Pastoral Constitution on The Church in The Modern World, para. 51.
60. Ibid., para. 87.
61. The treatment on conscience in this section merely summarizes the consideration as found in the manuals of Catholic theology. These considerations are then applied to the question under discussion.
62. Vatican II, Declaration on Religious Freedom, para. I.

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